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Global games with endogenous information often exhibit multiple equilibria. In this paper
we show how one can nevertheless identify useful predictions that are robust across all equilibria
and that could not have been delivered in the common-knowledge counterparts of these games.
Our analysis is conducted within a flexible family of games of regime change, which have been
used to model, inter alia, speculative currency attacks, debt crises, and political change. The
endogeneity of information originates in the signaling role of policy choices. A novel procedure
of iterated elimination of non-equilibrium strategies is used to deliver probabilistic predictions
that an outside observer—an econometrician—can form under arbitrary equilibrium selections.
The sharpness of these predictions improves as the noise gets smaller, but disappears in the
complete-information version of the model.
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1 Introduction
In the last fifteen years, the global-games methodology has been used to study a variety of socio-
economic phenomena, including currency attacks, bank runs, debt crises, political change, and party
leadership.1 Most of the appeal of this methodology for applied work comes from the fact that it
provides a toolkit to arrive at unique-equilibrium selection in settings with coordination problems
and self-fulfilling beliefs. This selection facilitates positive and normative predictions that were
impossible to make as long as these settings were ridden with multiple equilibria.
More recent work, however, has questioned the applicability of such unique-equilibrium selection
by showing that multiple equilibria may naturally reemerge once one recognizes the endogeneity
of the information structure. Such endogeneity can result from economic mechanisms that are
often central to the applications under consideration. Examples include the signaling role of policy
interventions (e.g., Angeletos, Hellwig and Pavan, 2006); the aggregation of information through
prices (Angeletos and Werning, 2006; Hellwig, Mukherji, and Tsyvinski, 2006; Ozdenoren and
Yuan, 2008); the manipulation of information through propaganda (Edmond, 2011); and learning
in dynamic settings (Angeletos, Hellwig and Pavan, 2007; Chassang 2010).
In the present paper, we show how global-game techniques may continue to deliver tight and
useful predictions even when the endogeneity of information precludes equilibrium uniqueness. We
illustrate this possibility within a flexible family of games of regime change in which the endogeneity
of the information originates from the signaling role of the actions of a policy maker. Applications
may include a central bank trying to defend a currency peg against a speculative attack; a gov-
ernment facing a self-fulfilling debt crisis; a party leader trying to preempt a defection by party
members and donors; or a dictator seeking to prevent a revolution.
The backbone of our framework is therefore similar to that in Angeletos, Hellwig and Pavan
(2006), combining a global coordination game with a signaling game.2 The contribution, however, is
distinct. That earlier work guessed and verified the existence of a particular set of equilibria, which
sufficed for establishing equilibrium multiplicity, but did not identify any predictions that hold true
across the entire equilibrium set. By contrast, the present paper develops a novel procedure of
iterated elimination of non-equilibrium strategies, which need not help establish the existence of
1The global-games methodology was pioneered by Carlsson and van Damme (1993) and then extended by Morris
and Shin (2003) and Frankel, Morris and Pauzner (2003). Applications include Morris and Shin (1998), Corsetti,
Dasgupta, Morris and Shin, (2004), and Guimaraes and Morris (2006) for currency crises; Rochet and Vives (2004)
and Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) for bank runs; Corsetti, Guimaraes and Roubini (2006) and Zwart (2007) for
debt crises; Chamley (1999) and Dasgupta (2006) for investment dynamics; Edmond (2006) for political change; and
Dewan and Myatt (2007) for party leadership.
2To be precise, our framework is more general in that it allows for a more flexible payoff structure. This gener-
alization permits us to nest novel applications and to illustrate the broader applicability of our approach. The key
contribution of the present paper, however, is not in this generalization per se, but rather in the nature of the results,
as explained in the main text.
1
any particular equilibria, but nevertheless identifies a set of predictions that must hold true in any
candidate equilibrium.
This explains why, not only the spirit of the contribution, but also the theoretical arguments
in the present paper are closer to standard global games than to our earlier work. In particular,
the procedure we develop in this paper shares two important similarities with the iterated deletion
of dominated strategies in standard global games (e.g., Carlsson and van Damme, 1993, Morris
and Shin, 2002). First, contagion effects emerge across different states of nature because, and
only because, of the incompleteness of information. Second, these contagion effects permit one to
iteratively rule out more and more strategy profiles by showing that they are inconsistent with
equilibrium reasoning.
At the same time, there is an important difference. In standard global games, the players’
information about the state of nature—and the associated belief hierarchies—are exogenous. By
contrast, beliefs are endogenous in our setting, because of the signaling role of policy. As a result,
our procedure puts iteratively tighter bounds, not only on the strategies that can be played in the
coordination game among the agents (the receivers), but also on the strategies that can be played
by the policy maker (the sender) and thereby on the endogenous belief hierarchies that obtain in
the coordination game. This explains the complexity and the novelty of the procedure.
Once the strategy profiles that survive this procedure have been identified, the next step is to
translate the results into probabilistic statements that can guide empirical work. To this goal, we
introduce an arbitrary sunspot (correlation device) whose realization determines the equilibrium
being played. We then ask what restrictions the theory imposes on the joint distribution of fun-
damentals (which are henceforth identified with the type of the policy maker), policy choices, and
regime outcomes from the perspective of an outside observer—say, an econometrician—who is un-
certain about which equilibrium is played (that is, who does not know the realization of the sunspot
variable).
We are thus able to reach the following testable predictions that hold irrespective of equilibrium
selection (i.e., irrespective of the sunspot distribution).
(i) The probability of regime change is monotone in the fundamentals: weaker policy types face
a higher probability of regime change.
(ii) The probability of policy interventions is non-monotone in the fundamentals: the policy maker
intervenes when his type is neither too strong nor too weak.
(iii) The “need” for policy intervention vanishes as agents become better informed about the type of
the policy maker: for all positive-measure sets of types, the probability of policy intervention
vanishes as the precision of the agents’ information grows.
(iv) The possibility of multiple equilibria hinges on the possibility of policy intervention: if the
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policy maker could commit to a particular policy before observing his type, then he could also
guarantee a unique equilibrium. Nonetheless, the policy maker can prefer such commitment
over discretion only in so far he expects his type to be strong: weak types are always better off
with the option to intervene, despite the fact that this option introduces multiple equilibria.
A number of remarks are worth making regarding the predictions documented above and the
overall contribution of the paper.
Although the aforementioned predictions seem quite intuitive, none of them could have been
made on the basis of the complete-information variant of the model: that variant is ridden with so
many equilibria that “almost anything goes”. What is more, even though the equilibrium set in our
framework is not a singleton, it features a sharp discontinuity that is reminiscent of that in standard
global games: in the limit as the noise vanishes, the set of equilibrium outcomes of our framework is
a measure-zero subset of its complete-information counterpart. These points underscore how global-
game techniques retain a strong and useful selection bite in our framework despite the endogeneity
of information and the ensuing equilibrium multiplicity.
The predictions documented above are, of course, also satisfied in Angeletos, Hellwig and Pavan
(2006), for the latter is a special case of the framework considered here. This, however, does
not mean that one could have reached these predictions from that earlier work. The guess-and-
verify arguments used in that earlier work were sufficient for establishing the existence of particular
equilibria, but were inadequate to identify the set of necessary conditions that must be satisfied by
any candidate equilibrium. This explains why the theoretical arguments contained in the present are
different from those in that earlier work, and are instead closer to the type of iterative elimination
arguments used in standard global games.
Identifying necessary conditions that hold for all equilibria does not directly translate to useful
testable predictions. One must first study how these necessary conditions map into restrictions on
fictitious data generated by the model. The second step we take in this paper is therefore an integral
part of our contribution, even though it is not specific to global games.
The above point also explains why the predictions we deliver are only probabilistic: as players
can randomize across multiple equilibria, the predicted relations between exogenous fundamentals
and endogenous equilibrium outcomes is stochastic. This property, in turn, offers an interesting
contrast to unique-equilibrium models. In such models, the theory typically delivers a deterministic
relation between exogenous fundamentals and endogenous outcomes. Before taking the theory to
the data, the econometrician must therefore add some randomness in the form of a residual.3 This
residual is most often justified either as measurement error or as explanatory variables that were
left outside the theory. By contrast, our approach permits one to accommodate this residual as an
3For example, think of the theory delivering the prediction Y = βX, and the econometrician then testing the
relation Y = βX + ε, where Y are the endogenous variables, X the exogenous fundamentals, and ε the residual.
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integral part of the theory, as the empirical counterpart of random equilibrium selection.4
Equilibrium poses restrictions, not only on the relation between fundamentals, policy choices
and regime outcomes, but also on the relation of these objects to the agents’ hierarchy of beliefs.
Predictions that have to do with the structure of beliefs may be of special interest to the theorist.
Nonetheless, such predictions seem of limited value for applied purposes, since beliefs—and espe-
cially higher-order beliefs—are unlikely to be contained in the data that are typically available in
applied work. Similarly, predictions that tie the effectiveness of policy interventions to, say, 12th
order beliefs are also of little value to real-world policy makers. This explains why our analysis
concentrates on predictions about the joint distribution of a limited set of variables—fundamentals,
policy choices, and regime outcomes—that seem of interest for practical purposes.
This last point also provides a possible re-interpretation of our results. In games with exogenous
information, Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) and Penta (2012) have shown that equilibrium multiplicity
is degenerate as long as one considers a sufficiently rich topology over belief hierarchies. It is unclear
whether a variant of that result applies to the type of environments with endogenous information
that we are interested in. But even if it does, the ultimate question of interest here is not per se
the determinacy of the equilibrium, but rather the sharpness of the predictions an outside observer
can make on the basis of limited data about the belief hierarchy.
In particular, we cannot rule out the possibility that one can induce unique-equilibrium selection
in our setting by considering sufficiently rich perturbations of the information structure, including
perturbations of the signaling technology. Nonetheless, to the extent that different equilibria are
selected by different perturbations, as it is indeed the case in Weinstein and Yildiz (2007), then
the essence of our results will survive: one would only have to re-interpret the uncertainty the
econometrician faces about equilibrium selection in our setting with the uncertainty he may face
about the relevant perturbation.
Layout. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up our framework.
Section 3 constructs the aforementioned procedure of iterated deletion of non-equilibrium strategies
and shows how this procedure identifies a set of tight necessary conditions for the entire equilibrium
set. Section 4 translates these conditions into probabilistic predictions about the relation between
fundamentals, policy choices and regime outcomes. Section 5 studies the equilibrium value of the
option to intervene. Section 6 contrasts the incomplete-information game to its common-knowledge
counterpart. Section 7 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
4The spirit of this point is similar to that in Chari and Kehoe (2003). That paper consider a setting with a unique
equilibrium and herding dynamics. In that setting, the econometrician could face significant uncertainty about the
relevant economic outcomes (the occurrence of a crisis) conditional on the observable fundamentals (the strength of
the regime), not because of equilibrium multiplicity, but because he could not observe the precise signals observed
by the agents and the precise sequence in which agents move.
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2 Model
The economy is populated by a big player, who seeks to influence the fate of a regime, and a
continuum of small atomistic players, who must choose whether or not to attack the regime (i.e.,
to take actions that favor the status quo or that favor regime change). To fix ideas, we think of the
big player as a “policy maker,” and refer to the small players as to the “agents”. We index the latter
by i, assume that they are distributed uniformly over [0, 1], and denote by A ∈ [0, 1] the measure
of the agents attacking the regime (the aggregate size of the “attack”).
Depending on the application of interest, the policy maker could be a central bank trying to
avoid the devaluation of a currency (Obstfeld, 1996; Morris and Shin, 1998), a debtor trying to
convince creditors to roll over their loans (Calvo, 1988; Corsetti, Guimaraes and Roubini, 2006,
Zwart, 2007); a dictator trying to prevent political unrest (Edmond, 2006); or a party leader trying
to keep the party united (Dewan and Myatt, 2007). As we explain below, the payoff structure we
assume is sufficiently flexible to permit any of these possible interpretations of our framework.5
Fundamentals, policy actions, and regime outcome. The payoff structure is parametrized
by an exogenous random variable θ ∈ R. This variable may affect the strength of the status quo, the
policy maker’s preferences, or the agents’ costs and benefits from regime change. The realization of
this variable is known to the policy maker, but is only imperfectly observed by the agents. As in
the related literature, hereafter we refer to θ interchangeably as to the underlying “fundamentals”
and the policy maker’s “type.”
Before agents move, the policy maker can take a costly action in an attempt to influence the
agents’ behavior and the fate of the regime. In the context of speculative currency attacks, think
of capital controls and monetary interventions that raise domestic interest rates. In the context of
debt crises, think of fiscal austerity measures and structural reforms. In the context of a dictatorial
regime, think of measures that strengthen the militia, increase the stakes for the supporters of the
regime, suppress dissent, or appease the general public with pro-democratic reforms. Finally, in the
context of party leadership, think of various concessions and promises made by a party leader in
order to discourage his fellow party members (or donors) from defecting.
We capture the action of the policy maker by a variable r ∈ [r,+∞), which is under the direct
control of the policy maker. The regime outcome need not be under his direct control, but can
be influenced by his policy choice. We assume that regime change occurs if R (θ, r, A) ≤ 0, and
does not occur if R (θ, r, A) > 0, where R is a continuous function, strictly increasing in θ, strictly
decreasing in A, and nondecreasing in r. These monotonicities—which mean that the chances
the status quo survives increase with the fundamentals, decrease with the size of the attack, and
5Our framework is flexible but, of course, too abstract to accommodate the institutional details of any particular
application. Adding such details may complicate the analysis. However, it may also tighten the predictions, for
specific applications can justify tighter assumptions on the payoff structure.
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(weakly) increases with the policy maker’s action—are quite natural given the class of applications
we have in mind. For example, in the context of currency crises, the above assumptions capture the
idea that devaluation is more likely when the size of the speculative attack is larger and less likely
when the policy maker succeeds in securing a larger amount of reserves. In the context of political
unrest, they capture the idea that the regime’s probability of survival decreases with the size of the
insurgent group and increase with the amount of resources the regime spends on strengthening its
police and militias.6
Policy maker’s payoff. The policy maker’s payoff is given by the function
U(θ, r, A) =
{
W (θ, r, A) if R(θ, r, A) > 0
L(θ, r) if R(θ, r, A) ≤ 0.
We assume that the functions W and L are continuously differentiable and satisfy the following
conditions:7
1. Wr(θ, r, A) < 0 and Lr(θ, r) < 0;
2. WA(θ, r, A) ≤ 0;
3. there exists a threshold θ, defined below, such that W (θ, r, 0) − L(r, θ) is strictly increasing
in θ for all θ ≥ θ and all r > r.
4. W (θ, r, A)− L(θ, r) > 0 if R(θ, r, A) > 0.
The first assumption simply means that policy interventions are costly, both in case the status
quo survives and in case of regime change. Depending on the application of interest, this assumption
may reflect the distortionary effects of higher domestic interest rates (in the context of currency
crises), or the economic and political costs of fiscal austerity (in the context of sovereign debt crises).
The second assumption means that, conditional on the regime surviving, the policy maker
(weakly) prefers a smaller attack. The case where W is independent of A corresponds to a situation
where the policy maker cares about the size of the attack A only in so far the latter affects the fate
of the regime, as in the case of a political candidate whose payoff is only determined by whether or
not he wins an election or, more generally, of whether or not he retains power.
The third assumption is an increasing-difference condition akin to the role played by familiar
single-crossing conditions in signaling games: if setting the minimal-cost policy r leads to regime
change while raising the policy to some level r > r spares the status quo from an attack and results
6Note that the regime outcome is a deterministic function of (θ, r, A), implying that in equilibrium the policy
maker faces no uncertainty about regime outcomes. We expect, however, our results to extend to a setting where,
with a small probability, the regime collapses for exogenous reasons—e.g., think of devaluation occurring as a result
of a large attack by noise traders.
7Throughout, for any function f : Rn → R we let fx denote its partial derivative with respect to argument x.
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in the status quo being preserved, higher types have a stronger incentive to raise the policy than
lower types.
The fourth assumption means that the policy maker would not prefer to see the regime collapse
when it survives. This assumption is trivially satisfied when the fate of the regime is directly
controlled by the policy maker, as typically assumed in models of currency attacks.8 To capture a
richer set of applications, such as political change, we are allowing the regime outcome to be beyond
the direct control of the policy maker; to get sharper predictions, we are ruling out the possibility
that the policy maker’s preferences for the fate of the regime are negatively correlated with the
regime’s strength.
Finally, note that L is not allowed to depend on A: conditional on regime change, the policy
maker’s payoff is assumed to be independent of the size of the attack. This assumption is more
restrictive than the preceding ones, but need not be unnatural. For example, once a dictator has
been thrown out power, he might not care anymore about the exact size of the revolt that overthrew
him–in fact, he might actually be dead! In the context of currency crises, on the other hand, this
assumption may be motivated by the idea that the cost of defending the peg against a speculative
attack are largely waived if the central bank decides not to defend. Putting aside these possible
justifications, the reason we impose this assumption is that it facilitates an important step in our
characterization procedure: it guarantees that, along any equilibrium, policy interventions signal
the policy maker’s confidence that regime change will not occur in equilibrium.9
The agents’ payoff. As standard in coordination games, what matters for the agents is the
payoff differential between attacking and not attacking. Consequently, we normalize the payoff from
not attacking to zero and let the payoff that each agent obtains in case he attacks be given by
u(θ, r, A) =
{
−Q(r) if R(θ, r, A) > 0
Z(θ, r)−Q(r) if R(θ, r, A) ≤ 0.
The term Q(r) > 0 captures the various costs of attacking in case the attack fails and the regime
is maintained, while the term Z(θ, r) > 0 captures the gross benefit of attacking when the at-
tack is successful.10 The functions Z and Q are bounded, continuously differentiable, and satisfy
Zθ, Zr ≤ 0 ≤ Qr, for all (θ, r). In the context of a currency attack, for example, Q(r) represents the
transaction and other costs that a speculator has to bear in order to attack, while Z(θ, r) represents
8To capture the possibility that the fate of the regime is directly controlled by the policy maker, we can add a
final stage during which the policy maker decides whether or not to abandon the status quo after observing the size
of attack A. The policy maker would then decide to abandon the status quo if and only if it is in his interest to do
so; that is, R (θ, r, A) > 0 if and only if W (θ, r, A) > L(θ, r).
9This assumption can thus readily be replaced with the weaker assumption that, conditional on regime change,
the policy maker’s optimal choice is r = r.
10Our results extend to the case where Z also depends on the size of the attack A, to the extent that this dependence
preserves strategic complementarity in the agents’ actions. However, because the exposition is heavier in that case,
we restrict attention here to the case where Z depends only on (θ, r).
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the devaluation premium; the dependence of Q on r then captures the ability of the government
to manipulate these costs, while the dependence of Z on θ and r captures the possibility that
the shadow value of the peg increases with either the quality of the fundamentals or various fiscal
reforms that can be undertaken by the government.
Timing and information. The game evolves through two phases. In the first phase, the policy
maker sets the policy r after learning θ. In the second phase, agents decide simultaneously whether
or not to attack, after observing the policy r, and after receiving private signals xi = θ+ σξi about
θ; the scalar σ ∈ (0,∞) parameterizes the quality of the agents’ information, while ξi is noise, i.i.d.
across agents and independent of θ, with a continuous probability density function ψ strictly positive
and differentiable over the entire real line, with corresponding cumulative distribution function Ψ.
The common prior about θ is uniform over the entire real line.11
Dominance regions. As in all global games, the selection power of incomplete information
hinges on the introduction of dominance regions. The ones we assume here are based on two intuitive
properties. When the fundamentals are sufficiently weak (low θ), regime change is inevitable,
irrespective of the size of the attack and of the level of policy intervention. Likewise, when the
fundamentals are sufficiently strong (high θ), the status quo survives irrespective of the size of the
attack and of policy interventions. In either case, the policy maker refrains from intervening. These
properties are embedded in our model as follows.





for any r. This assumption identifies the interval (θ, θ¯] with the “critical region” of
fundamentals over which the regime outcome hinges on the size of the attack,12 and guarantees that
it is dominant for the policy maker to set r = r whenever θ ≤ θ (in which case regime change is
inevitable). Next, we assume that limθ→+∞ ρ(θ) = r, where ρ(θ) is defined as the maximal level of
r that is not strictly dominated by r for a policy maker of type θ.13 This assumption guarantees
that any policy action r > r is dominated by inaction (r = r) for sufficiently high fundamentals.14
11As in the rest of the literature, this improper prior is used only for convenience; the results generalize to any
bounded smooth prior as long as σ, the noise in the agents’ private signals, is small enough.
12The assumption that this region is invariant to r is only for expositional simplicity.
13To understand whether raising the policy to some level r > r is strictly dominated by leaving the policy at r,
recall thatW (θ, r, A) is non-increasing in A and that L(θ, r) is independent of A. It follows that the best-case scenario
following the former choice is that no agent attacks (A = 0), while the worst-case scenario following the latter choice
is that all agents attack (A = 1). Furthermore, because regime change is inevitable for θ ≤ θ and because the payoff
L(θ, r) in case of regime change is independent of A and decreasing in r, it follows that ρ(θ) = r for all θ ≤ θ. In
contrast, for any θ ∈ (θ, θ¯], any r, regime change occurs if all agents attack and does not occur if all agents refrain
from attacking, implying that ρ(θ) = sup{r ≥ r : W (θ, r, 0) ≥ L(θ, r)}. Lastly, for any θ > θ¯, regime change never
occurs, irrespective of the size of the attack, which means that ρ(θ) = sup{r ≥ r : W (θ, r, 0) ≥W (θ, r, 1)}.
14The role of this condition is to rule out equilibria where interventions occur also for arbitrarily high types. These
equilibria seem unrealistic and are not robust, for example, to the possibility that the noise in the agents’ signals has
bounded support. Instead of invoking the assumption of bounded noise, in the sequel we assume directly that policy
intervention is dominated for sufficiently high types.
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Finally, we assume that Z(θ, r) > Q(θ, r) for all (θ, r) such that θ ≤ θ¯ and r ≤ ρ(θ). This assumption
simply means that an agent who expects regime change finds it optimal to attack at least in so far
the policy maker does not play a dominated action.
3 Equilibrium
Our equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. Let r (θ) denote the policy chosen by type
θ, µ(θ|x, r) the cumulative distribution function of the posterior belief of an agent who receives a
signal x and observes a policy r, a (x, r) the action of that agent, A(θ, r) the corresponding aggregate
size of attack, and D(θ, r) the resulting regime outcome, with D(θ, r) = 0 if R(θ, r, A(θ, r)) > 0,
that is, if the status quo is maintained, and D(θ, r) = 1 if R(θ, r, A(θ, r)) ≤ 0, that is, if regime
change occurs.15 The equilibrium definition can then be stated as follows.
Definition. An equilibrium consists of a strategy for the policy maker, r : R→ [r,+∞), a posterior
belief for the agents, µ : R2 × [r,+∞) → [0, 1], a strategy for the agents, a : R× [r,+∞) → {0, 1},
and an aggregate attack function, A : R× [r,+∞)→ [0, 1], such that
r(θ) ∈ arg max
r
U(θ, r, A (θ, r)) ∀θ (1)
µ (θ|x, r) is obtained from Bayes’ rule using r(·) for any x ∈ R and any r ∈ r(R) (2)
















dx ∀(θ, r) (4)
where r(R) ≡ {r : r = r(θ), θ ∈ R} is the set of policy interventions that are played in equilibrium.
The equilibrium regime outcome is given by
D (θ) ≡ D(θ, r(θ)) =
{
0 if R (θ, r(θ), A(θ, r(θ))) > 0
1 otherwise.
Conditions (1) and (3) require that the policy maker’s and the agents’ actions be sequentially
rational. Condition (4) requires that the aggregate size of attack is the one that obtains by aggre-
gating the strategy of the agents. Finally, condition (2) requires that, on the equilibrium path, the
agents’ beliefs be pinned down by Bayes’ rule.16
Before proceeding to the characterization of the equilibrium set, we introduce some additional
notation. Let E(σ) denote the set of all possible equilibria in the game with quality of information
σ. Next, for any s ≥ r, let E(s;σ) denote the set of equilibria in which r(θ) ∈ {r, s} for all θ,
15All equilibrium objects depend on σ, the level of noise, but this dependence is left implicit unless otherwise stated.
16Note that the equilibrium definition restricts attention to symmetric pure-strategy profiles; as discussed at the
end of this section, this is without loss of generality.
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meaning that the policy takes either the cost-minimizing value r or the value s. For any (θ1, θ2)









1−Ψ(x−θ1σ ) + Ψ(x−θ2σ )
= Q(r). (5)
This threshold identifies the unique signal x at which an agent who believes that θ /∈ [θ1, θ2] and
that regime change occurs if and only if θ ≤ θ1 is indifferent between attacking and not attacking
when observing r = r. Finally, let






denote the aggregate size of attack that obtains when the policy maker’s type is θ2 and agents attack
if and only if x < X(θ1, θ2;σ).
3.1 Characterization
We now proceed to state our key two characterization results. The first one uses a novel procedure of
iterated deletion of strategy profiles that cannot be part of an equilibrium in order to obtain tighter
and tighter bounds on the equilibrium set. These bounds, which are presented in Proposition 1
and formally derived in subsection 3.2 below, play a central role in our analysis: they contain the
equilibrium set; they rule out a large set of strategy profiles, including many of those that could
have been equilibrium profiles under complete information; and they drive the core predictions we
present in Section 4. Yet, these bounds need not always be the sharpest: in general, we cannot
rule out the possibility that the equilibrium set is strictly smaller than the set identified by these
bounds. We eliminate this ambiguity in Proposition 2 for the case that the policy maker’s payoff
satisfies a natural single-crossing property.
Proposition 1 (necessary conditions). The following properties are true for any σ > 0.
(i) The equilibrium set is given by E(σ) = ∪s≥rE (s;σ).
(ii) If E (r;σ) 6= ∅, then any equilibrium in E (r;σ) is such that
D (θ) = 1 if and only if θ ≤ θ#,
where θ# = θ#(σ) is the unique solution to
R
(
θ#, r, B(θ#, θ#;σ)
)
= 0. (7)
17The fact that equation (5) admits a unique solution is established in Appendix B: see the proof of Property 3
inside the proof of Proposition 9.
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(iii) For any s > r, if E (s;σ) 6= ∅, then there exists a pair of thresholds (θ∗s , θ′′s ) with θ′′s ≥ θ∗s
such that18


















s ;σ)) > 0 (9)
or




s ;σ)) = 0. (10)
(iv) For any s > r, if E (s;σ) 6= ∅, then any equilibrium in E (s;σ) is such that
r(θ) = s only if θ ∈ [θ∗s , θ∗∗s ] and D (θ) =
{
1 for θ < min{θ∗s , θ#}




s (σ) ≡ sup
{
θ′′s ≥ θ∗s : θ′′s satisfies condition (9) or (10)
}
. (11)










Part (i) establishes that, in any equilibrium, either the policy is left at r by all θ, or it is raised
to the same level s > r by all types who raise the policy above r. Parts (ii) characterizes the subset
of equilibria in which all types pool on r = r. It identifies a unique threshold θ# such that, in any
such equilibrium, regime change occurs if and only if θ ≤ θ#.19 As implied by Condition (7), this
threshold is the lowest threshold θ′ for which the regime survives when each agent expects no type
of the policy maker to raise the policy above r and regime change to occur if and only if θ < θ′, in
which case each agent attacks if and only if he receives a signal x < X(θ′, θ′;σ), which implies that
the size of the attack at θ′ is given by B(θ′, θ′;σ).20
Next, consider the subset of equilibria in which some type raises the policy to s, for some s > r.
Part (iii) identifies necessary conditions for such an equilibrium to exist. Part (iv) in turn establishes
that, in any such equilibrium, there exists a pair of thresholds θ∗s and θ∗∗s such that (a) the policy
is raised to s only if θ ∈ [θ∗s , θ∗∗s ], (b) regime change never occurs for θ > θ∗s and (c) regime change
18When we say that there exists a threshold θ∗s satisfying (8), we mean that the set {θ ≥ θ : W (θ, s, 0) ≥ L (θ, r)}
is non-empty.
19Our discussion in the main text suppresses the dependence of θ#, r#, and θ∗∗ on σ to simplify the exposition,
although this dependence remains explicit in the statement of the formal results.
20Not surprisingly, this threshold coincides with the one that obtains in a variant of our game that restricts the
policy to r ∈ {r} for all θ, which is the case typically studied in global games with exogenous information – see e.g.,
Morris and Shin (1998) for an application to currency crises.
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always occurs for θ < min{θ∗s , θ#}.21 The threshold θ∗s identifies the lowest type of the policy maker
who prefers raising the policy to s to leaving the policy at r, when the former choice discourages
each agent from attacking and spares the policy maker from regime change, whereas the latter
choice leads to regime change. As evident from Conditions (9) and (10), θ∗∗s in turn identifies the
highest type θ′′s ≥ θ∗s who finds it optimal to raise the policy to s when leaving the policy at r
leads to an attack of size A = B(θ∗s , θ′′s ;σ). Recall that B(θ∗s , θ′′s ;σ) is the size of the attack that
obtains at θ = θ′′s when, after observing r, each agent attacks if and only if he receives a signal
x ≤ X(θ∗s , θ′′s ;σ). In the proof below, we will show that, when θ′′s is the highest type to raise the
policy to s, then it is iteratively dominated for each agent to attack for any x > X(θ∗s , θ′′s ;σ), which
implies that B(θ∗s , θ′′s ;σ) is the largest attack that type θ′′s can expect to face in case he decides to
leave the policy at r. It follows that, for type θ′′s to prefer raising the policy to s than leaving the
policy at r, it must be that that the largest attack B(θ∗s , θ′′s ;σ) that type θ′′s can possibly expect
in case he leaves the policy at r either leads to regime change or to a payoff W (θ′′s , r, B(θ∗s , θ′′s ;σ))
that is lower than the payoff W (θ′′s , s, 0) that type θ′′s could obtain by raising the policy to s and
guaranteeing that no agent attacks.
Note that, while Proposition 1 identifies properties that any equilibrium must satisfy, it does
not guarantee existence of equilibria satisfying such properties. This incompleteness, however,
disappears once we impose the following single-crossing restriction on the policy maker’s payoff.
Let ∆W (θ; r,A) ≡ W (θ, r, 0)−W (θ, r, A) denote the payoff differential between raising the policy
to r > r and facing no attack and leaving the policy at r and suffering an attack of size A, when
the policy maker’s type is θ and both choices lead to no regime change.
Single-Crossing Condition (SCC). The differential ∆W (θ; r,A) changes sign at most once as
θ increases from θ to +∞: for any A > 0 and r > r, either ∆W (θ; r,A) < 0 for all θ ≥ θ, or
there exists a θ+(r,A) > θ such that ∆W (θ; r,A) > 0 if θ < θ+(A, r) and ∆W (θ; r,A) < 0 for
θ > θ+(A, r).
The SCC thus requires that, in the absence of regime change, the net benefit of reducing the size
of the attack from A to zero by raising the policy from r to r changes sign only once. Obviously,
this condition is trivially satisfied when the policy maker cares about the size of the attack only
in so far it affects the regime outcome (i.e., when WA(θ, r, A) = 0 for all (θ, r, A), in which case
∆W (θ; r,A) < 0 for all θ), an assumption that is often made in games of political change that are
modeled as a “winner-takes-all election.”)
21When θ∗s > θ#, our procedure of iterated deletion of non-equilibrium strategies does not permit us to pin down
the equilibrium regime outcome for θ ∈ [θ#, θ∗s ]. What we know is that, if equilibria exist where θ∗s > θ#, then no
type θ ∈ [θ#, θ∗s ] would raise the policy to s. As explained below, this indeterminacy vanishes if one assumes that the
policy maker’s payoff satisfies the single-crossing condition SCC (see Proposition 2 below), or if one assumes that σ
is small (see Proposition 9 in Appendix A).
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Proposition 2 (complete characterization). Suppose SCC holds. Then, the following properties
are true for any σ > 0:
(i) E (s;σ) 6= ∅ if and only if s ≤ r#(σ), where r#(σ) is the threshold defined in Proposition 1.
(ii) For any s ∈ (r, r#(σ)], there exists an equilibrium in E (s;σ) in which r(θ) = s for all
θ ∈ (θ∗s , θ∗∗s (σ)] (for all θ ∈ [θ∗s , θ∗∗s (σ)] if θ∗s > θ).
These results complement Proposition 1 in three ways. First, they rule out the possibility of
equilibria in which the policy is raised to s > r#. Second, for any s ≤ r#, they guarantee existence
of equilibria in which some type of the policy maker raises the policy to s. Finally, they establish
that the thresholds θ∗s and θ∗∗s are the sharpest bounds for the set of types who possibly raise the
policy to s, in the sense that there always exists an equilibrium in which the policy is raised to s
for the entire interval (θ∗s , θ∗∗s ].22
As the name indicates, the role played by SCC in these results is to guarantee that the policy
maker’s preferences (and hence his incentives) satisfy a natural ordering condition; when leaving
the policy at r leads to an attack that is non-increasing in θ, then if type θ∗∗s prefers raising the
policy to s than leaving the policy at r, so does any type θ ∈ (θ∗s , θ∗∗s ].
Remark 1. Proposition 2 can be viewed as a generalization of the results in Propositions
1, 2, and 5 of Angeletos, Hellwig and Pavan (2006): that paper considered a more restrictive
payoff specification, which happened to satisfy SCC, and established existence of a particular set
of equilibria in which the policy maker intervenes for intermediate types. None of the results in
that paper, however, permits one to identify properties that hold true across all equilibria. Apart
from the more flexible payoff specification, the key contribution here is thus not Proposition 2 but
Proposition 1. It is this novel result, and only this one, that permits one to identify predictions that
are robust across the entire equilibrium set, whatever that might be.
Remark 2. In Section 4 below, we show how the properties identified above can be translated
into stochastic predictions about policy interventions and regime outcomes as well as into predic-
tions for how the bounds on these variables change with the fundamentals and with the quality
of the agents’ information. These results hinge on parts (iii)-(iv) of Proposition 1, but depend on
Proposition 2 only in so far the results in Proposition 2 rule out the possibility of equilibria in
which s > r#. This possibility is problematic for our purposes because Proposition 1 guarantees
monotonicity of the regime outcome for s ≤ r# but not for s > r#. The role of SCC is precisely to
rule out this possibility for any σ > 0. When SCC fails to hold, it is unclear whether equilibria with
s > r# exist. Even if such equilibria exist, they would not interfere with our predictions as long as
22The result in Proposition 2 leaves open the possibility that there also exist equilibria in which the policy is raised
only for a strict subset of (θ∗s , θ∗∗s ]. These equilibria are sustained by the agents following a strategy, after observing
the policy maker’s choice of not intervening, that is non-monotone in their signals. Although this possibility does not
interfere with the predictions we deliver in the sequel, it can be ruled out if one assumes that the noise distribution
is log-concave, an assumption which is often made in applications—see Proposition 10 in Appendix A.
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they maintain monotonicity of regime outcomes. Furthermore, one can show that, irrespective of
whether or not SCC holds, equilibria with s > r# cannot exist in the limit as σ → 0 (see Propo-
sition 9 in Appendix A). We conclude that the predictions we deliver in the sequel are unlikely to
hinge on SCC.
3.2 Characterization procedure
We now expand on the series of arguments that lead to Proposition 1. As anticipated, this series of
arguments deals with the interaction of two kinds of forces. On the one hand, the incompleteness of
information, coupled with the existence of dominance regions, induces a series of contagion effects
across different types of the policy maker, as well as across different signals for the agents. On
the other hand, the signaling role of policy implies that the information, and the belief hierarchy,
in the continuation game that follows any particular policy choice is endogenous to equilibrium
play. The contagion effects are reminiscent of those in standard global games, but the endogeneity
of information invalidates standard global-game arguments. The interaction of these two forces
therefore explains the novelty and complexity of some of the arguments that follow.
We start by considering the subset of equilibria in which all types pool on r. When this is
the case, the observation of r conveys no information, and the coordination game that follows this
observation is essentially a standard global game. The next lemma then follows from the same
kind of arguments as in Morris and Shin (1998, 2003), adapted to the more general environment
considered here. (Remark: in all lemmas that follow, the variables θ#, r#, θ∗s , and θ∗∗s are those
defined in Proposition 1.)
Lemma 1. In any equilibrium in which no type intervenes, D (θ) = 1 if and only if θ ≤ θ#.
The above lemma establishes part (ii) of Proposition 1. The next two lemmas shift attention to
equilibria in which some types raise the policy above r and help establish part (i) of the proposition.
Lemma 2. In any equilibrium in which some type intervenes, there exists a single s > r such that
r (θ) = s whenever r (θ) 6= r. Furthermore, for that s, A(θ, s) = 0 for all θ.
Lemma 3. For any s > r, if E(s;σ) 6= ∅, then there exists a θ ≥ θ such that W (θ, s, 0) ≥ L (θ, r) .
Furthermore, any equilibrium in E(s;σ) is such that D(θ) = 0 for all θ > θ∗s .
The key insights behind these two lemmas are simple. First, a type finds it optimal to intervene
only if he expects that, by doing so, he will reduce the size of the attack and/or reduce the chances
of regime change by strengthening the status quo. Second, if a certain type avoids regime change by
raising the policy to r, then any higher type must also be avoiding regime change in equilibrium—for
any higher type can always “imitate” any lower type and do at least as well.
These properties are intuitive. Clearly, there must be some benefit, in the form of a reduction in
the size of the attack and/or a reduction in the probability of regime change, to justify the cost of
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intervention. Our model captures this benefit in a stark way, by guaranteeing that no attack takes
place with probability one following any (equilibrium) intervention. This is because we have ruled
out any source of aggregate uncertainty in the size of the attack and in the regime outcome beyond
the one introduced by the random type of the policy maker. In the absence of such aggregate
uncertainty, equilibrium policy interventions necessarily signal that regime change will not occur
(for, otherwise, the policy maker would be better off by not intervening). This in turn implies that,
in equilibrium, any type who intervenes does so by selecting the least costly policy among those
that are conducive to no regime change, as stated in Lemma 2.
One should not, however, misinterpret Lemma 2 as saying that a single level of policy intervention
is consistent with equilibrium behavior. Rather, as established in Proposition 2, there is a continuum
of policy levels s > r that can be played in some equilibrium. Furthermore, the same type θ may
be playing different r in different equilibria, just as the same r may be played by different θ. This
point underscores that Lemma 2 has very little positive content on its own right, and anticipates
the necessity of the additional arguments we make in Section 4.
Lemma 2 nevertheless helps us index the equilibrium set in a convenient way: any equilibrium
that does not belong to E(r;σ) necessarily belongs to E(s;σ) for some s > r. Together with Lemma
1, this lemma therefore establish part (i) of Proposition 1.
Finally, Lemma 3 guarantees that the threshold θ∗s is an upper bound for the set of types for
whom regime change occurs, across all equilibria in E(s;σ). This is because any type above this
threshold can always save the regime (and then obtain a payoff higher than in case of regime change)
by raising the policy to s and then face no attack. Any type θ > θ∗s who, in equilibrium, leaves the
policy at r must thus necessarily expect a small attack that does not trigger regime change. Clearly,
θ∗s is also a lower bound on the set of types who possibly raise the policy to s: For any type below
this threshold, raising the policy to r = s is dominated by leaving the policy at r.
Moving on, the next lemma uses a contagion argument to establish that the threshold θ∗∗s defined
in Proposition 1 is an upper bound to the set of types who potentially raise the policy to r = s.
Lemma 4. For any s > r, if E(s;σ) 6= ∅, then there exists a θ′′s ≥ θ∗s that satisfies either condition
(9) or condition (10) in Proposition 1. Furthermore, any equilibrium in E(s;σ) is such that r (θ) = s
only if θ ∈ [θ∗s , θ∗∗s ].
The proof of Lemma 4 encapsulates contagion effects from very high types, for whom raising the
policy is dominated, to lower types, who are spared from the need to raise the policy thanks, and
only thanks, to the incompleteness and dispersion of information among the agents. In particular,
the fact that raising the policy is dominated for sufficiently high types implies that agents, on their
part, find it iteratively dominant to not attack for sufficiently high signals, conditional on observing
no policy intervention.23 The dispersion of information then initiates a contagion effect that triggers
23That raising the policy to r = s is dominated for arbitrarily high types follows from the assumption that
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agents not to attack for lower and lower signals and hence spares the policy maker from the need
to raise the policy for lower and lower θ. In the limit, this contagion converges to θ∗∗s , guaranteeing
that all types above this threshold (i) are able to avoid regime change without intervening, and (ii)
obtain a higher payoff by leaving the policy at r and facing a small attack than by raising the policy
to s and face no attack.
Underscoring the power of this contagion effect, the limit threshold θ∗∗s is arbitrarily close to θ∗s
when σ is small enough (See Proposition 9 in Appendix A) meaning that almost all types for whom
policy intervention is not dominated succeed to avoid regime change without the need for costly
policy interventions. This is despite the fact that the aforementioned contagion effect is initiated
with types that can be arbitrarily high.
Lemma 4 used a contagion argument “from above” to identify a necessary condition for existence
of equilibria in which the policy is raised to r = s > r by some type and identified an upper
bound θ∗∗s for the set of types who possibly raise the policy to r = s. The next lemma uses an
alternative contagion argument “from below” to establish that regime change necessarily occurs for
any θ < min{θ∗s , θ#}.
Lemma 5. Take any s > r and suppose that E (s;σ) 6= ∅. Then any equilibrium in E(s;σ) is such
that D(θ) = 1 for any θ < min{θ∗s , θ#}. Furthermore, θ∗s > θ# if and only if s > r#.
As explain in the Appendix, the contagion effect behind the above result is also present because,
and only because, of the dispersion of information. In particular, the fact that, for sufficiently
low types, raising the policy is dominated along with the fact that, for these types, regime change
is inevitable, implies that agents find it iteratively dominant to attack for sufficiently low signals
as long as they do not observe policy intervention. The dispersion of information then initiates a
contagion effect such that, conditional on seeing no intervention, agents find it iteratively dominant
to attack for higher and higher signals, in which case regime change occurs for higher and higher
θ. In the limit, this contagion effect guarantees that regime change occurs for all types below
min{θ∗s , θ#} in any equilibrium in which the policy is raised to s. This last result is obtained by
comparing the agents’ incentives to attack after observing r with the corresponding incentives when
they expect r(θ) = r for all θ. Because the observation of r is most informative of regime change
when all types who experience regime change set r = r, while some of the types who are spared
limθ→+∞[W (θ, s, 0) −W (θ, r, 1)] < 0. Without an assumption of this sort, there may exist equilibria in which the
policy maker intervenes even for arbitrarily high types. These equilibria are sustained either by the assumption that
the cost of intervention vanishes for sufficiently high types, or by the agents threatening to attack no matter how
favorable their signal is when the policy maker fails to intervene. We find either property implausible. Also note that
equilibria in which the agents attack no matter their signal when r = r are not robust to the following perturbation.
Pick any K > θ¯ and any δ > 0 and suppose that with probability δ types θ > K are forced to set r and assume
that this event is not observed by the agents. The aforementioned equilibria are not robust to this perturbation, no
matter how unlikely this event is (i.e. no matter δ) and no matter how big K is.
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from regime change raise the policy above r, the size of attack when setting r = r is necessarily
larger in any of the equilibria in which some types are expected to raise the policy to r = s than
in the pooling equilibria where all types are expected to set r = r. Hence any type θ < θ# who
does not raise the policy to r = s necessarily experiences regime change in equilibrium. Because
raising the policy to r = s is dominated for all θ < θ∗s , this implies that regime change occurs for
any θ < min{θ∗s , θ#} in any equilibrium in which the range of the policy is {r, s}.24
The combination of Lemmas 1 through 5 establishes the results in Proposition 1.
Remark 3. As noted before, Lemma 2, which guarantees that no agent attacks following the
observation of an equilibrium policy intervention, hinges on the absence of exogenous aggregate
uncertainty. Exogenous aggregate uncertainty could originate in shocks to fundamentals and/or
unpredictable shifts in the “sentiment” of some irrational agents that occur after the policy maker
has set the policy. While the introduction of such additional uncertainty may deliver a smoother
relationship between the probability of regime change and the level of policy intervention, we do
not expect our results to be unduly sensitive to our choice of abstracting from such additional
uncertainty. For example, it is easy to show that all our results are robust to the introduction of
an exogenous random event that triggers regime change independently of r, which one could then
interpret either as the result of unfavorable changes in the fundamentals or as the impact of a severe
attack by “irrational agents”. Clearly, the same remains true if the probability of this “exogenous”
event is decreasing in θ.25 While it could be worthwhile to extend the analysis to more general, and
more realistic, sources of aggregate uncertainty, this is beyond the scope of the present paper.
Remark 4. The equilibrium definition we have used rules out mixed strategies for either the
policy maker or the agents; it also imposes symmetry on the agents’ strategies. However, from the
arguments in the proofs of Lemmas 1-5, it should be clear that none of the conditions identified
in these lemmas depends on these restrictions. Indeed, the policy maker can find it optimal to
randomize over r only for a zero-measure subset of θ; because this does not have any effect on the
agents’ posterior beliefs about policy and regime outcomes, it cannot affect their best-responses.
Similarly, for any r, the agents can find it optimal to randomize over their decision to attack, or
to play asymmetrically, only for a zero-measure subset of their signal space; because this does not
have any effect on the aggregate size of attack, it does not impact the policy maker’s incentives.
Propositions 1 and 2 thus identify properties of all equilibrium outcomes, including those sustained
by mixed-strategy or asymmetric-strategy profiles.
24That θ∗s < θ# if and only if s < r# follows from the monotonicity of W (θ, s, 0)−L(θ, r) in θ along with Wr < 0.
25Obviously, all relevant thresholds must be adjusted to accommodate the probability of this exogenous event. It
is also immediate to see that the probability of such event must not be too high, for otherwise each agent may find it
optimal to attack irrespective of his beliefs about the policy maker’s strategy and the behavior of the other agents.
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4 Predictions about policy and regime outcomes
We now show how the equilibrium properties identified in the previous section can be translated to
meaningful predictions that an outside observer, say an “econometrician”, can make without knowing
which particular equilibrium is played. To this goal, we consider two complementary approaches.
The first approach formalizes the econometrician’s uncertainty about the equilibrium being played
by means of a generic distribution over the set of all possible equilibria, and then proceeds to study
the implied distribution of equilibrium outcomes. The second approach studies the extrema of all
such possible distributions.
4.1 Probabilistic predictions for arbitrary equilibrium selections
Notwithstanding our earlier remark that SCC might not be strictly needed, we henceforth impose
SCC. We then have that, for any σ > 0, the equilibrium set is given by E(σ) = ∪s∈[r,r#(σ)]E(s;σ),
where E(s;σ) denotes the set of equilibria in which the range of the policy is {r, s}. Different
equilibria within the set E (s;σ) are associated with different out-of-equilibrium strategies by the
agents. They may also differ in the shape of the policy within the interval [θ∗s , θ∗∗s ], but only if the
distribution of the noise in the agents’ information is not log-concave (see the result in Proposition
10 in Appendix A). Nevertheless, all equilibria within the set E (s;σ) are characterized by the same
bounds θ∗s and θ∗∗s on the set of types who possibly raise the policy, as well as by the same regime
outcomes.26 Given the type of predictions we are interested in, from the econometrician’s viewpoint,
any distribution over outcomes generated by a random selection over the equilibrium set E (σ) can
then be replicated by a random variable s˜ with cumulative distribution function F and support
Supp[F ] ⊆ [r, r#] such that one of the pooling equilibria is played when s = r, while one of the
semi-separating equilibria with range {r, s} is played when s ∈ (r, r#]. For any σ, we then denote
by F(σ) the set of the c.d.f.s. with support Supp[F ] ⊆ [r, r#(σ)] that describe the possible beliefs
that the external observer may have about the equilibrium being played.27 (Note that the reason
why this set depends on the quality σ of the agents’ information is that the upper bound r#(σ) for
the set of possible equilibrium policy interventions depends on σ).
26To be precise, the last statement is true only up to a zero-measure set of types: if the type is exactly equal
to the threshold θ∗s , there is both an equilibrium in E (s;σ) for which the status quo survives and one for which
regime change occurs. However, this kind of indeterminacy is irrelevant as long as one forms probabilistic statements
over positive-measure sets of fundamentals. To simplify the exposition, in the sequel we impose that the status quo
survives when θ = θ∗s . Relaxing this assumption does not affect the essence of any of the results; it only complicates
the exposition by requiring that Propositions 3 and 5 be restated in terms of probabilistic statements conditional on
θ belonging to positive-measure sets rather that conditional on θ taking a specific value. Propositions 4 and 6, on
the other hand, are not affected at all.
27As a technical restriction, we assume that F(σ) is compact with respect to the metric d(·) defined, for any pair
F1, F2 ∈ F , by d(F1, F2) ≡ sup {|F1(A)− F2(A)| : A ∈ Σ} , where Σ is the Borel sigma algebra associated with the
interval [r, ρ(θ¯)].
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Importantly, note that, because θ is the policy maker’s private information, the equilibrium
being played cannot be a function of θ. This also means that the external observer cannot expect
the realization of the random variable s˜ with distribution F to depend of θ. On the other hand,
the external observer may be able to observe the policy maker’s type θ at the time he/she performs
her investigations (for example, the underlying economic fundamentals that parametrize the policy
maker’s type may become observable ex-post).
Now, for any σ > 0 and any s ∈ [r, r#], let Ds (θ;σ) denote the regime outcome in any of the
equilibria in E (s;σ) , while, for any s ∈ (r, r#], let ∆s ≡ θ∗∗s − θ∗s denote the (Lebesgue) measure
of the set of types who potentially raise the policy to r = s in any of the equilibria in E (s;σ).28
Recall that there is no equilibrium in which some type outside the interval [θ∗s , θ∗∗s ] raises the policy
to s, while there is an equilibrium in which all types in [θ∗s , θ∗∗s ] raise the policy to r = s. Given the
uniform prior, ∆s can thus also be read as (a rescaling of a sharp) bound on the probability that
the policy is raised to r = s across all equilibria in E (s;σ) .
Next, let Ipremise denote the indicator function assuming value one if premise is true and zero
otherwise. For any selection (equivalently, for any belief) F ∈ F(σ), and any r > r, then let
D(θ;F, σ) ≡
∫
Ds(θ;σ)dF (s) and P (r, θ;F, σ) ≡
∫
s≥r
I{θ∈[θ∗s ,θ∗∗s (σ)]}dF (s)
denote, respectively, the probability that regime change occurs for type θ and the (maximal) prob-
ability that type θ raises the policy to or above r, when the selection is F .29 For any r > r, any
F ∈ F(σ), then let ∆(r;F, σ) denote the expected Lebesgue measure of the set of types who possibly
raise the policy to or above r. Once again, ∆(r;F, σ) can be read as a (rescaling of) the maximal
probability that the policy is raised to or above r, when the selection is F. Given two selections
F, F ′ ∈ F(σ), then let F ′  F if and only if F ′(s) ≤ F (s) for all s, with strict inequality for
s ∈ (r, r#) and equality for s ∈ {r, r#}.
The key predictions about the probability of regime change and of policy interventions that the
theory delivers to an external observer who is (potentially) uncertain about which equilibrium is
played are summarized in the following proposition.30
Proposition 3 (stochastic predictions). Equilibrium policies and regime outcomes satisfy the
following properties.
(i) Non-monotonic policy. For any σ > 0, any r > r and any F ∈ F(σ), there exist
thresholds θ◦ = θ◦(r;F, σ) and θ◦◦ = θ◦◦(r;F, σ), with θ < θ◦ ≤ θ◦◦, such that P (r, θ;F, σ) > 0 only
if r ≤ r#(σ) and θ ∈ [θ◦, θ◦◦].
28Recall that θ∗s is independent of σ.
29Recall that any equilibrium in E (s;σ) is such that r(θ) = s only if θ ∈ [θ∗s , θ∗∗s (σ)] so that P (r, θ;F, σ) is an upper
bound on the probability that type θ raises the policy to or above r.
30The predictions that the theory delivers to an observer who knows which equilibrium is played can be read by
looking at the special case where the distribution F has a measure-1 mass point at a particular s ∈ [r, r#(σ)].
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(ii) Monotonic regime outcome. For any σ > 0 and any F ∈ F(σ), D(θ;F, σ) is non-
increasing in θ, with D(θ;F, σ) = 1 for θ ≤ θ and D(θ;F, σ) = 0 for θ > θ#(σ).
(iii) Impact of “aggressiveness”. For any σ > 0 and any F, F ′ ∈ F(σ), F ′  F implies
D(θ;F ′, σ) > D(θ;F, σ) for any θ ∈ (θ, θ#(σ)) such that D(θ;F, σ) < 1. Moreover, if F, F ′ ∈ F(σ)
are such that F ′(r) = F (r) and F ′(s) < F (s) for all s ∈ (r, r#(σ)), then ∆(r;F ′, σ) ≤ ∆(r;F, σ).
(iv) Impact of noise. Take any F such that Supp[F ] ⊂ (r, limσ→0+ r#(σ)). For any r >
r, limσ→0+ ∆(r;F, σ) = 0 whereas, for any θ, any σ, σ′ > 0 such that F ∈ F(σ) ∩ F(σ′), then
D(θ;F, σ) = D(θ;F, σ′). Finally, for any σ, σ′ > 0 such that F ∈ F(σ) ∩ F(σ′), σ′ > σ > 0 implies
∆(r;F, σ′) ≥ ∆(r;F, σ) for all r ∈ (r,min{r#(σ), r#(σ′)}).
Parts (i) and (ii) say that, for any given quality of information σ > 0 and any selection F ∈ F(σ),
the probability of observing the policy maker raising the policy above r is positive only if r ≤ r#(σ)
and θ is intermediate, whereas the probability of regime change is non-increasing in θ and equal
to zero for all θ > θ#(σ). These results follow directly from the fact that these properties hold
in any of the equilibria of the game (as established in Proposition 1) and hence are preserved in
expectation.
Property (iii), on the other hand, can be interpreted as the impact of the “aggressiveness of
market expectations”: the higher the level of policy intervention s at which the agents switch to
lenient behavior (i.e., refrain from attacking), the higher the cost of policy intervention necessary to
prevent an attack, and the smaller the set of types who find it optimal to intervene in equilibrium.
Of course, since the level of “aggressiveness” (equivalently, the distribution F ) is not necessarily
observed by the econometrician, this prediction is hard to test. Yet, it could help the econometrician
identify, or estimate, the underlying equilibrium selection, F , from observed data.
Part (iv) says that, holding constant the econometrician’s beliefs F about which equilibrium
is played, an increase in the quality of the agents’ information need not have any effect on the
probability of regime change, whereas it reduces the probability of observing a policy above r, for
any r > r, with such a probability vanishing in the limit, when information becomes infinitely
precise. This result follows from the fact that, for any s > r, the threshold θ∗s below which regime
change occurs and above which it does not occur is independent of the quality of the agents’
information (recall that this threshold is determined by the comparison between the policy maker’s
payoff when, by raising the policy to s, he saves the regime by inducing no agent to attack, and his
payoff when, by leaving the policy at r = r, he induces regime change). In contrast, the threshold
θ∗∗s (σ) above which no type raises the policy to s in any of the equilibria where the range of the
policy is {r, s} is nondecreasing in σ and converges to θ∗s as σ → 0. The reason is that, as the agents’
information becomes more precise, the size of the attack that the policy maker expects by leaving
the policy at r converges to zero for all θ > θ∗s (reflecting the fact that all agents correctly realize
that regime change will not occur). As a result, in the limit as σ → 0, no type above θ∗s finds it
optimal to raise the policy to s. Along with the fact that there is no equilibrium where some type
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below θ∗s raises the policy to s, independently of the quality of information (recall that raising the
policy to s is strictly dominated by leaving the policy to r for any θ < θ∗s), this means that the
measure of types who raise the policy to s vanishes as the quality of the agents’ information grows
large enough. By implication, a similar result obtains when the econometrician integrates across
different equilibria using the selection F.
This last result is interesting because it suggests that the precision of the agents’ information
need not be important for whether or not regime change occurs in equilibrium31, but it may be
crucial for whether or not the status quo is maintained with or without policy intervention. Note,
however, that this result presumes that the econometrician’s beliefs F do not vary with σ. Because
the model imposes no relation between F and σ, this is possible, although not necessary.
Remark 5. The result in part (ii) of Proposition 3 delivers a monotonic relation between
fundamentals (the policy maker’s type) and the regime outcome, while at the same time allowing
for some “randomness” in this relation corresponding to the econometrician’s uncertainty about the
equilibrium being played. This is akin to the predictions one often gets from unique-equilibrium
models, except for the following feature. In unique-equilibrium models, the theory typically restricts
the residual in the relation between the dependent and the independent variables to be zero; the
randomness is then superimposed by the econometrician on the basis of the presumption that there
is measurement error or omitted variables that nonetheless do not bias the results. Here, instead,
the theory itself allows for a random residual: the residual simply captures the econometrician’s
uncertainty over the equilibrium being played.32
4.2 Bounds across all selections
As anticipated above, the theory also delivers useful predictions to an econometrician interested
in testing, or estimating, the model, but who is not willing to assume (or let the data identify) a
particular distribution over the equilibrium being played. This can be done by considering bounds on
the probability of regime change and on the probability of intervention across all possible equilibria
and then investigating how these bounds change with the fundamentals θ (which may be observable
ex-post) and/or with the quality of the agents’ information σ.
To illustrate, let D(θ1, θ2;F, σ) ≡ 1θ2−θ1
∫ θ2
θ1
D(θ;F, σ)dθ denote the probability of regime change
conditional on the event that θ ∈ [θ1, θ2], for given selection F ∈ F(σ), and D¯(θ1, θ2;σ) ≡
supF∈F(σ)D(θ1, θ2;F, σ) andD(θ1, θ2;σ) ≡ infF∈F(σ)D(θ1, θ2;F, σ) the corresponding bounds across
31It may be important only for types θ ∈ (θ#(σ), θ#(σ′)) in case one of the pooling equilibria is played, a possibility
that is ruled out in the proposition by the assumption that Supp[F ] ⊂ (r, limσ→0+ r#(σ)).
32Of course, additional randomness can also be superimposed in our model. As anticipated above, all the results
in Proposition 3 extend to the case where the regime outcome is affected by random shocks that are exogenous to
the interaction between the policy maker and the agents and whose probability is non-increasing in the quality of the
fundamentals. The introduction of such shocks makes the relation between the fundamentals and the probability of
regime change possibly smoother, without however affecting the qualitative nature of the conclusions.
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all selections. Similarly, let P (r, θ1, θ2;F, σ) ≡ 1θ2−θ1
∫ θ2
θ1
P (r, θ;F, σ)dθ denote the probability that
the policy is raised to or above r, conditional on the event that θ ∈ [θ1, θ2], for given selection F ∈
F(σ), and P¯ (r, θ1, θ2;σ) ≡ supF∈F(σ) P (r, θ1, θ2;F, σ) and P (r, θ1, θ2;σ) ≡ infF∈F(σ) P (r, θ1, θ2;F, σ) =
0 the corresponding bounds. Clearly, D¯(θ1, θ2;σ) ≥ D(θ1, θ2;σ) and P¯ (r, θ1, θ2;σ) ≥ P (r, θ1, θ2;σ),
with strict inequalities when θ ≤ θ1 < θ2 ≤ θ# and r < r < r#. That these bounds do not coincide
over a subset of the critical region reflects the equilibrium indeterminacy. The next proposition
examines how these bounds depend on the fundamentals θ and the quality of information σ.
Proposition 4 (bounds). (i) Fix σ > 0 and r ∈ (r, r#(σ)). The bounds D(θ1, θ2;σ) and
D¯(θ1, θ2;σ) are non-increasing in (θ1, θ2), while the bounds P (r, θ1, θ2;σ) and P¯ (r, θ1, θ2;σ) are
non-monotone in (θ1, θ2), in the partial-order sense.
(ii) Fix (θ1, θ2). D(θ1, θ2;σ)and P (r, θ1, θ2;σ) are independent of σ. For any (θ1, θ2) any σ, σ′ >
0, θ2 < min{θ#(σ′), θ#(σ)} or θ1 > max{θ#(σ′), θ#(σ)} imply D¯(θ1, θ2;σ) = D¯(θ1, θ2;σ′). In
contrast, limσ→0+ P¯ (r, θ1, θ2;σ) = 0 for any r > r and any θ1, θ2 ∈ R. In the special case where the
agents’ gross payoff in case of regime change is fixed (i.e., Z(θ, r) = z > r for all θ), then the bound
D¯(θ1, θ2;σ) is independent of σ whereas the bound P¯ (r, θ1, θ2;σ) is a nondecreasing function of σ.
The results for how the bounds are affected by the fundamentals follow from Proposition 1. Thus
consider the effect of information on the bounds. While more precise information need not affect the
bounds on the probability of regime change, it affects the bounds on the probability of intervention.
In particular, in the limit as σ → 0, the probability of observing policy interventions above r, for
any r > r, vanishes for all measurable sets of θ, whereas the probability of regime change can take
any value for any subset of (θ, θ#(0+)), where θ#(0+) ≡ limσ→0+ θ#(σ). The intuition for these
results parallels that for the results in part (iv) of Proposition 3. The key difficulty in establishing
these results comes from the need to establish that the equilibrium set converges to its limit-version
uniformly across types and selections, as we show in the Appendix.
These properties are particularly sharp when the payoff the agents obtain in case of regime
change is independent θ. In this case, both the lower and and the upper bound on the probability
of regime change are independent of σ,33 whereas the upper bound on the probability of policy
interventions is decreasing in the quality of information σ−1 and vanishes in the limit as σ → 0+.
More generally, what the theory predicts is that policy choices are essentially uniquely determined
in the limit, whereas the regime outcomes remain largely indeterminate. We will return to these
33This follows from the fact that, in this case, the threshold θ# below which regime change occurs and above which
it does not occur in any of the pooling equilibria, is independent of σ. If follows that, for any θ ∈ (θ, θ#], any σ > 0,
there exist equilibria in which regime change occurs (these are the equilibria that select θ∗s > θ) as well as equilibria in
which regime change does not occur (these are the equilibria that select θ∗s < θ). Hence, the regime outcome remains
indeterminate for all θ ∈ (θ, θ#]. In contrast, as shown in Proposition 3, the probability that the policy is raised to or
above any r > r vanishes for all positive-measure set of types, a property which is then inherited by the supremum
across all selections, using the uniform convergence result mentioned in the main text.
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predictions and contrast them to their counterparts under common knowledge in Section 6.
5 Predictions about payoffs
We now turn to the predictions that the theory delivers for the payoff of the policy maker. In
contrast to predictions about policy choices and regime outcomes, predictions about payoffs need
not be directly testable (the econometrician may not be able to directly observe the policy maker’s
payoff). Nevertheless, these predictions are important for their policy implications. For example,
they permit one to study the ex-ante value that the policy maker may attach to the option to
intervene once θ is realized.
For any s ∈ [r, r#], let Us (θ;σ) denote the lowest payoff that type θ obtains across all the
equilibria in E (s;σ) . Next, consider the variant of our model in which r is exogenously fixed at r
for all θ, interpret this as the game in which the option to intervene is absent, and let Uo (θ;σ) denote
the payoff that type θ obtains in the unique equilibrium of this game. Clearly, when s ∈ {r, r#(σ)},
any equilibrium in E (s;σ) is such that Us (θ;σ) = Uo (θ;σ) for all θ.34 Thus consider equilibria in
which s ∈ (r, r#).
Proposition 5 (payoffs). For any s ∈ (r, r#(σ)), either Us (θ;σ) ≥ Uo (θ;σ) for all θ, with strict
inequality for some θ, or there exists a threshold θ†s(σ) ≥ θ#(σ) such that Us(θ;σ) < Uo (θ;σ) only
if θ > θ†s(σ), in which case necessarily Us (θ;σ) ≥ Uo (θ;σ) for all θ ≤ θ†s(σ) (with strict inequality
if θ ∈ (θ∗s , θ†s(σ)]). Moreover, σ small enough ensures that the first case holds.
To understand this result, note first that types below θ# cannot be worse off with the option
to intervene: without this option, they would necessarily experience regime change, whereas with
this option they can avoid regime change in some equilibria. Next, consider types above θ#. These
types can be worse off with the option to intervene only if the size of the attack that they face
when they opt for not raising the policy exceeds the one they would have faced absent the option
to intervene. In general, this may be possible for some equilibria. However, this possibility vanishes
as the precision of information increases. This is because the regime threshold θ∗s in any of the
equilibria with intervention is necessarily lower than θ#, the regime threshold in any of the pooling
equilibria. Together with the fact that θ∗∗s → θ∗s as σ → 0 guarantees that the size of the attack is
also lower, as long as σ is small enough.
The results in Proposition 5 extend to random equilibrium selections. Indeed, fix an arbitrary
set of types [θ1, θ2] ⊂ R and an arbitrary selection F ∈ F(σ) and consider the implied probability
that, conditional on θ ∈ [θ1, θ2], the policy maker is strictly worse off with the option to intervene.
This probability is zero either for all σ, or at least for σ small enough. Notwithstanding the fact
34The result is immediate when s = r. For s = r#(σ), the result follows from the fact that θ∗s = θ∗∗s (σ) = θ#(σ)
and Xs(θ∗s , θ∗∗s (σ);σ) = x#(σ).
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that, in general, the selection F may also depend on σ, this property suggests that the risk of being
worse off with the option to intervene vanishes as the agents’ information becomes highly precise.
We can also accommodate the case that the selection F changes with σ by considering bounds on
equilibrium payoffs across all possible equilibria. Let U (θ;σ) and U (θ;σ) denote, respectively, the
supremum and infimum of the set of equilibrium payoffs that type θ can obtain in the game with the
option to intervene, when the quality of information is σ. The following proposition characterizes
the relation between these bounds and the payoff obtained in the game in which the option to
intervene is absent.
Proposition 6 (payoff bounds). U (θ;σ) ≥ Uo (θ;σ) for all θ > θ, with strict inequality for
θ ∈ (θ, θ#(σ)] and with limθ→+∞ |U (θ;σ)−Uo (θ;σ) | = 0. On the other hand, there exists a threshold
θ† (σ) ≥ θ#(σ) such that U (θ;σ) < Uo (θ;σ) only if θ > θ† (σ) . Finally, limσ→0+ U (θ;σ) =
limσ→0+ Uo (θ;σ) for all θ.
The result that U (θ;σ) ≥ Uo (θ;σ) follows from the fact that, in the game with the option
to intervene, there always exist equilibria where each type above θ > θ can induce all agents to
not attack by raising the policy infinitesimally above r thus obtaining a payoff arbitrarily close to
the highest feasible payoff W (θ, r, 0). In contrast, in the game without the option to intervene,
the highest feasible payoff W (θ, r, 0) may be attainable only by sufficiently high types (for whom
A(θ, r) becomes arbitrary small). These observations explain the results in the proposition that
pertain to the upper bound on the equilibrium payoff. The results for the lower bounds follow from
essentially the same arguments discussed above in relation to Proposition 5—very high types can
be worse off with the option to intervene only if there exist equilibria in which the size attack that
each type faces when he does not raise the policy above r is larger than in the game without the
option to intervene. However, even if such equilibria exist, low types continue to be (weakly) better
off with the option to intervene, no matter the equilibrium being played, for these types would have
experienced regime change without the option to intervene. Finally, the result that, as σ → 0,
U (θ;σ) converges to Uo (θ;σ) for all θ follows from the fact that, as σ → 0, the lower bound on the
equilibrium payoffs in the game with the option to intervene is attained under any of the pooling
equilibria, which is clearly the same payoff as in the game in which the option to intervene is absent.
Now imagine that, before knowing his type, the policy maker decides whether to maintain or to
give up the option to intervene after learning θ. The aforementioned results suggest that, in general,
the policy maker need not be able to ensure that he will be better off with the option to intervene
no matter the realized θ: he may get “trapped” in an equilibrium in which he is worse off when
θ turns out to be sufficiently high. Even then, however, the policy maker is better off for low θ.
Therefore, the option to intervene either is beneficial for all θ, or it implements a form of ex-ante
insurance across types.
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6 Contrast to common knowledge
We now contrast the predictions that the theory delivers for the incomplete-information game with
those for its common-knowledge counterpart. We further show that, while multiplicity obtains in
our model for any level of noise, the set of equilibrium outcomes becomes smaller and smaller (in
an appropriate sense) as the quality of information improves—but it explodes when the noise is
zero. The purpose of these exercises is two-fold: (i) to highlight that the selection power of global
games retains significant bite also in games like ours where the endogeneity of information leads to
multiple equilibria; and (ii) to establish that the predictions that we have identified, albeit intuitive,
would not have been possible with complete information.
Recalling that ρ(θ) denotes the maximal level of r that is not strictly dominated by r for a policy
maker of type θ, we have the following result.
Proposition 7 (common knowledge). Consider the game with σ = 0.
(i) A policy r(·) can be part of a subgame-perfect equilibrium if and only if r(θ) ≤ ρ (θ) for
θ ∈ (θ, θ¯] and r(θ) = r for θ /∈ (θ, θ¯].
(ii) A regime outcome D(·) can be part of a subgame-perfect equilibrium if and only if D (θ) = 1
for θ ≤ θ, D (θ) ∈ {0, 1} for θ ∈ (θ, θ¯], and D (θ) = 0 for θ > θ¯.
This result contrasts sharply with the results in Propositions 1-4. None of the predictions in the
game with incomplete information are valid in the game with common knowledge. In particular,
the policy can now take any shape in the critical region (θ, θ¯]. Similarly, the probability of regime
change can take any value within the critical region and need not be monotone in θ. In essence,
“almost anything goes” within the critical region under complete information. In particular, the only
policy choices and regime outcomes that are ruled out by equilibrium reasoning under complete-
information are those that are ruled out by strict dominance. A similar “anything-goes” result holds
if one looks at the policy maker’s payoff.
The contrast between the complete- and incomplete-information versions of our model is most
evident in the limit as σ → 0+. Let G(σ) denote the set of pairs (θ, r) such that, in the game
with noise σ ≥ 0, there is an equilibrium in which type θ sets the policy at r. Next, let ρ+ ≡
limθ→θ+ ρ(θ).
35 We then have the following result.
Proposition 8 (limit outcomes). Under complete information,
G(0) = {(θ, r) : either θ ∈ (θ, θ¯] and r ≤ r ≤ ρ(θ), or θ /∈ (θ, θ¯] and r = r} .
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Figure 1: Pairs (θ, r) that can be observed as equilibrium outcomes.
This result, which follows from the fact that, as σ → 0+, θ∗∗s → θ∗s for all s > r, is illustrated
in Figure 1 for an example in which Z(θ, r) = z, W (θ, r, A) = V (θ,A) − r and L(θ, r) = −r
and R(θ, r, A) = V (θ,A). The common-knowledge set, G(0), is given by the large triangular area.
The incomplete-information set, G(σ) for σ > 0 is given by the dashed blue area. In this case,
as long as σ > 0, the lower σ, the smaller the set of policies that can be played by any given θ,
and hence the smaller the dashed area in Figure 1 (i.e., σ′ > σ > 0 implies G(σ′) ⊃ G(σ)). The
monotonicity of G(σ) in σ does not necessarily hold in the case where the agents’ payoff in case
of regime change depends θ. However, as the proposition makes clear, what is true more generally
is that, in the limit, as the noise in information vanishes, the set of policies that can be sustained
in equilibrium for almost any given θ is a zero measure subset of the set of policies that can be
sustained under common knowledge. More precisely, the set G(σ) converges to the boundary points
of the set of policies that would have been possible under complete information for almost any
θ ≤ θ#(0+) ≡ limσ→0+ θ#(σ), and to the cost-minimizing policy r for θ > θ#(0+).
7 Concluding Remarks
The approach followed in most applications of global games is to use incomplete information as
a tool to select a unique equilibrium in coordination settings that admit multiple equilibria under
common knowledge—to assume certain exogenous information structures that ensure uniqueness,
without investigating what determines information in the first place. For certain questions, however,
the endogeneity of information is central to the phenomenon under examination and often brings
35Note that, in general, ρ+ can be strictly higher than ρ(θ) = r.
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back multiple equilibria. The broader methodological contribution of this paper is to illustrate that
this multiplicity may be very different from the one that obtains under common knowledge and,
more importantly, that it need not preclude concrete, intuitive, and testable predictions.
These predictions typically take the form of stochastic non-linear relations between the endoge-
nous variables of interest (e.g., the probability of regime change and of policy interventions) and the
primitives of the model (e.g., the underlying fundamentals) with the randomness originating in the
econometrician’s uncertainty over the equilibrium being played as opposed to measurement error
(as in unique-equilibrium models). Clearly, confronting these predictions with the data remains
more challenging than in unique-equilibrium models. Yet, recent advances in structural estimation
of multiple-equilibria models (e.g., Tamer, 2003, Ciliberto and Tamer, 2009, Grieco, 2010) may help
in this direction.
The procedure of iterated deletion of non-equilibrium strategies we used in the present paper
to identify sharp predictions rests, of course, on the specific channel of information endogeneity
we considered (signaling). In future work, it would be interesting to investigate how analogous
procedures can be used to deliver tight predictions in games where the endogeneity of information
comes from alternative channels, such as the aggregation of information through prices, or social
learning in dynamic settings.36
36Complementary in this respect is the recent paper by Chassang (2010). That paper applies global-game techniques
in a dynamic exit game in which repeated play sustains multiple equilibria despite the incompleteness of information.
The origin of multiplicity in that paper is therefore very different from the one that is the focus of our paper. The
two papers are nevertheless complementary in the sense that they both show how global-game techniques can retain
significant selection power even when they fail to deliver a unique equilibrium.
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Appendix A: Additional results
Proposition 1 in the main text left open the possibility of equilibria in which the policy is raised
to some s > r#. This possibility was ruled out in Proposition 2 by imposing SCC. Part (i) in the
next proposition shows that this possibility vanishes in the limit as σ → 0 even when SCC does
not hold, while parts (ii) and (iii) study the limit behavior of the range of policy intervention.
Proposition 9 (necessary conditions for small σ). For any ε > 0, there exists σ¯ > 0 such that
the following results hold for any σ < σ¯:
(i) E (s;σ) 6= ∅ only if s ≤ r#(σ) + ε;
(ii) whenever E (s;σ) 6= ∅ then θ∗s ≤ θ#(σ) + ε;
(iii) whenever E (s;σ) 6= ∅ and s ≥ r + ε then θ∗∗s (σ) ≤ θ∗s + ε.
Proposition 2 also left open the possibility of equilibria with s > r in which the policy is raised
for only a strict subset of the interval (θ∗s , θ∗∗s ). With SCC, this possibility rests on the agents
following a non-monotone strategy. This possibility can be ruled out by letting the distribution
of the noise be log-concave—a restriction that helps guaranteeing that, along any equilibrium, the
agents’ posteriors about θ, and hence their strategies, are monotone in their signals.
Proposition 10 (monotonicity of speculators’ behavior). (i) Suppose the noise distribution
ψ is log-concave. Then, for any σ > 0, any s ∈ (r, r#(σ)], E (s;σ) 6= ∅.
(ii) Suppose SCC holds and ψ is log-concave. Then for any σ > 0 and any s ∈ (r, r#(σ)], any
equilibrium in E (s;σ) is such that r(θ) = s for all θ ∈ (θ∗s , θ∗∗s ).
Part (i) in the above proposition establishes that log-concavity of ψ is, by itself, another sufficient
condition for the existence of equilibria in which the policy maker raises the policy to s, for any
s ∈ (r, r#(σ)].37 Part (ii) then establishes that the combination of log-concavity of ψ with SSC
suffices for ruling out equilibria in which the policy is raised for only a subset of the interval (θ∗s , θ∗∗s ),
which further sharpens the interpretation of (θ∗s , θ∗∗s ).
Appendix B: Omitted proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Considers the continuation game that follows the observation of r. Because
the observation of r conveys no information, this game is essentially a standard global game (e.g.,
Morris and Shin, 1998, 2003). The proof below shows that this game admits a unique continuation
37The role of log-concavity is to guarantee that, irrespective of the shape of the policy r in the region [θ∗s , θ∗∗s ],
the probability that each agent assigns to regime change when observing no intervention is necessarily decreasing in
the signal x. This in turn implies that the size of the attack A(θ, r) that the policy maker expects when he does not
intervene is necessarily decreasing in θ. As we show in the proof in Appendix B, under such monotonicities, one can
construct equilibria in which intervention occurs for a (possibly non-connected) subset of [θ∗s , θ∗∗s ].
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equilibrium in monotone strategies. Standard results from global games (based on iterated deletion
of strictly dominated strategies) then imply that this equilibrium is the unique equilibrium of the
continuation game.
Clearly any monotone continuation equilibrium must be characterized by thresholds x#(σ) and
θ#(σ) such that all agents attack if x < x#(σ) and not attack if x > x#(σ) in which case regime
change occurs if θ ≤ θ#(σ) and does not occur if θ > θ#(σ). Hereafter, we show that such a
continuation equilibrium exists and is unique. To simplify the notation, we momentarily drop the
dependence of the thresholds x#(σ) and θ#(σ) on σ.
First, note that an agent with signal x who expects regime change to occur if and only if θ ≤ θ#










dθ˜ −Q(r) ≥ 0. (13)
Because Z(·, r) is non-increasing, the left-hand-side of (13) is continuously strictly decreasing in x.38
Furthermore, it is strictly positive for x small enough and strictly negative for x large enough. It










dθ˜ = Q(r). (14)
Next, consider the fate of the regime. Because A(θ, r) = Ψ((x#−θ)/σ) is decreasing in θ, regime









Thus any monotone equilibrium is identified by a solution (x#, θ#) to conditions (14) and (15).
Below, we show that a solution to these conditions exists and is unique.



































)) ∈ (0, 1).
Next, let LHS(x#) denote the function of x# that is defined by the left-hand side of (14) once we





























38Note that, in any pooling equilibrium, after observing r = r, the agents’ posteriors beliefs that θ˜ < θ are given by
1−Ψ((x− θ)/σ). These beliefs can be ranked according to FOSD, implying that, given any non-increasing function
f(θ), the expected value of f given x is decreasing in x.
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which is clearly negative. Lastly, note that
lim
x#→−∞
LHS(x#) > Q(r) > 0 = lim
x#→+∞
LHS(x#)
By the Intermediate Value Theorem, it then follows that there exists a unique x# such that
LHS(x#) = Q(r). Given the uniqueness of x#, the uniqueness of θ# follows immediately from
(15). This establishes existence and uniqueness of a monotone continuation equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2. Because the policy maker faces no uncertainty about the size of the attack,
he can predict the fate of the regime with certainty. The assumption that the payoff L in case of
regime change is independent of A then implies that raising the policy above r and experiencing
regime change yields a lower payoff than leaving the policy at r.39 It follows that any type who in
equilibrium raises the policy above r must be spared from regime change, for otherwise he would be
strictly better off by setting r = r. By implication, the observation of any equilibrium policy r > r
necessarily signals to the agents that the status quo will be maintained and thus induces each agent
to not attack no matter his signal x. But then any type of the policy maker can always save on the
cost of intervention by setting the lowest r > r among those that are played in equilibrium. Hence
in any equilibrium in which some type intervenes, there exists a single s > r such that r (θ) = s
whenever r (θ) 6= r. Furthermore, no speculator attacks following the observation of r = s which
means that A(θ, s) = 0 for all θ. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3. That E(s;σ) = ∅ for any s > r for which W (θ, s, 0) < L (θ, r) for all θ
follows directly from the fact that, in this case, the net payoff that each type θ obtains by raising
the policy to s is strictly less than the payoff that the same type obtains by leaving the policy at r
39When leaving the policy at r leads to regime change, it follows from the assumption that L(θ, r) is strictly
decreasing in r; when, instead, it leads to no regime change, it follows from the assumption that W (θ, r, A) > L(θ, r)
when R(θ, r, A) > 0.
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(this is, irrespective of the agents’ behavior and of whether or not leaving the policy at r leads to
regime change). Thus consider s for which there exists a θ ≥ θ such that
W (θ, s, 0) ≥ L (θ, r) .
The assumption thatW (θ, s, 0)−L (θ, r) is strictly increasing in θ then implies that any type θ > θ∗s ,
by setting r = s, can guarantee himself a payoff strictly higher than the payoff that the same type
obtains by setting r = r and experiencing regime change (recall that, from Lemma 2, A(θ, s) = 0
for any θ). But then, in equilibrium, no type above θ∗s experiences regime change. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4. Consider the sequence {θn}∞n=0 constructed as follows. First, let
θ0 ≡ inf {θ ≥ θ∗s : W (θ, s, 0) < W (θ, r, 1) and R(θ, r, 1) > 0} .
That θ0 < +∞ follows from the assumption that limθ→+∞ {W (θ, s, 0)−W (θ, r, 1)} < 0, which
simply imposes that raising the policy is dominated for sufficiently high types. Next, for any n ≥ 1,
let
θn ≡ inf{θ ≥ θ∗s : g
(




where, for any θ ≥ θ, any (θ∗s , θ′) with θ′ ≥ θ∗s , and any σ > 0, the function g is defined by
g
(
θ; θ∗s , θ
′, σ
) ≡ U(θ, s, 0)− U (θ, r, A¯(θ; θ∗s , θ′))





and where X(θ∗s , θ′;σ) is the unique solution to (5). The
function g (θ; θ∗, θ′, σ) thus identifies the differential between the payoff that type θ obtains by
raising the policy to r = s, facing no attack and avoiding regime change, and the payoff that the
same type obtains by leaving the policy at r = r, facing an attack of size A¯(θ; θ∗s , θ′)—that is, the
attack implied by the agents play according to the threshold strategy with cutoff X(θ∗s , θ′;σ)—and







≤ 0. Note that, because θ∗s ≥ θ,
U(θ, s, 0) = W (θ, s, 0) for all θ > θ∗s . Furthermore, because W (θ, s, 0) > L(θ, r) for all θ > θ∗s , then
g (θ; θ∗s , θ′, σ) < 0 only if R
(
θ, r, A¯(θ; θ∗s , θ′)
)
> 0; that is, for any type above θ∗s to be better off by
leaving the policy at r = r, it must be that the size of the attack A¯(θ; θ∗s , θ′) triggered by leaving
the policy at r does not lead to regime change.
This sequence has a simple interpretation. In any equilibrium in which the range of the policy
is r(R) = {r, s}, no type θ /∈ [θ∗s , θ0] raises the policy to r = s. Given so, an agent who expects
regime change to occur if and only if θ < θ∗s and r (θ) = r if and only if θ /∈ [θ∗s , θ0] finds it optimal
to attack, when observing r, if and only if he receives a signal x ≤ X(θ∗s , θ0;σ). To see this, recall









1−Ψ(x−θ∗sσ ) + Ψ(x−θ
0
σ )
−Q(r) = 0 (17)
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Along with the fact that the expected payoff from attacking (the left hand side of (17)) is positive
for sufficiently low x and negative for sufficiently high x, this gives the result.
But then, by implication, an agent who expects the status quo to be maintained for all θ ≥ θ∗s
(but possibly also for some θ < θ∗s) and r (θ) = r for all θ /∈ [θ∗s , θ0] (but possibly also for some
θ ∈ [θ∗s , θ0]) never finds it optimal to attack for x > X(θ∗s , θ0;σ). To see this, note that when the
status quo is maintained also for some θ < θ∗s , the payoff that the agent expects from attacking
when he observes r is smaller than when regime change occurs for all θ < θ∗s . Similarly, when the
policy maker leaves the policy at r also for some θ ∈ [θ∗s , θ0], the observation r = r maps to a lower
posterior probability of regime change than when r = s for all θ ∈ [θ∗s , θ0]. Hence, the incentives
to attack after observing r are maximal when regime change occurs for all θ < θ∗s and r(θ) = s for
all θ ∈ [θ∗s , θ0], which explains why no agent ever finds it optimal to attack for x > X(θ∗s , θ0;σ).
Knowing this, a policy maker who expects no agent to attack for x > X(θ∗s , θ0;σ) never finds it
optimal to raise the policy to r = s for any θ > θ1. Knowing this, no agent finds it optimal to attack
for any x > X(θ∗s , θ1;σ) when observing r, and so on.
Below, we conclude the proof by establishing that the sequence {θn}∞n=0 is non-increasing. Be-
cause it is also bounded from below by θ∗s , it has to converge. Now the limit is θ∗∗s = max{θˆs, θ˙s}
where
θ˙s = sup{θ ≥ θ∗s : W (θ, s, 0) = W (θ, r, B(θ∗s , θ;σ)) and R(θ, r, B(θ∗s , θ;σ)) > 0}.
θˆs ≡ sup{θ ≥ θ∗s : R(θ, r, B(θ∗s , θ;σ)) = 0}
if at least one of the above two sets is non-empty. Else, the limit is θ∗s . In the latter case, by
the definition of the sequence {θn}∞n=0, no type above θ∗s is willing to raise the policy to r = s.
Together with the fact that W (θ, s, 0) < L (θ, r) for any θ < θ∗s , meaning that no type below
θ∗s is also willing to raise the policy, then this means that E(s;σ) = ∅. We conclude that, if
E(s;σ) 6= ∅, there must exists a θ′′s ≥ θ∗s such that (i) either W (θ′′s , s, 0) = W (θ′′s , r, B(θ∗s , θ′′s ;σ))
and R(θ′′s , r, B(θ∗s , θ′′s ;σ)) > 0, or (ii) R(θ′′s , r, B(θ∗s , θ′′s ;σ)) = 0.
We conclude the proof by showing that the sequence {θn}∞n=0 defined above is indeed non-
increasing. To see this, fix any s > r for which there exists a θ ≥ θ such that W (θ, s, 0) ≥ L (θ, r)
and let θ∗s = inf{θ ≥ θ : W (θ, s, 0) ≥ L (θ, r)}. Towards a contradiction, suppose that there exists
an n ≥ 1 such that θn > θn−1. Without loss of generality, then let n ≥ 1 be the first step in the
sequence for which θn > θn−1 (i.e., θj ≤ θj−1 for all j ≤ n− 1). By the definition of θn−1, then for
any θ > θn−1,
g
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> 0, meaning that the policy maker can avoid regime change by leaving
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Because θn−1 ≤ θn−2 and becauseX(θ∗s , ·;σ) is increasing, this in turn implies that, for any θ > θn−1,
g
(




By the definition of θn, this means that θn ≤ θn−1, which proves that the sequence {θn}∞n=0 is
non-increasing. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5. That D(θ) = 1 for any θ < θ∗s is trivial when θ∗s = θ. Thus assume θ∗s > θ.
The result that D(θ) = 1 for any θ < min{θ∗s , θ#(σ)} is then established by comparing the agents’
incentives to attack after observing r with the corresponding incentives when they expect r(θ) = r
for all θ.











Next, for any n ≥ 1, let θn ≡ min{θ∗s , θ′n}, where θ′n solves R(θ′n, r,Ψ(xn−1−θ
′
n
σ )) = 0, and let xn be











This sequence also has a simple interpretation. An agent who observes r = r and believes that
r(θ) = r for all θ and that no other agent attacks (in which case regime change occurs if and only
if θ ≤ θ), finds it optimal to attack if and only if x ≤ x0. By implication, an agent who expects no
other agent to attack and r(θ) = r for all θ < θ∗s (but possibly r(θ) > r for some θ > θ∗s) necessarily
finds it optimal to attack for any x < x0. This simply follows from the fact that the observation of
r is most informative of regime change when all types for whom regime change occurs set r = r,
while some of the types who save the regime raise the policy above r. However, if all agents attack
whenever x < x0, regime change occurs for all θ < θ1. This in turn implies that there exists an
x1 > x0 such that an agent who expects all other agents to attack if x < x0 (and hence regime
change to occur for all θ ≤ θ1) and who believes that r(θ) = r for all θ, necessarily finds it optimal
to attack for all x < x1. By implication, an agent who expects r(θ) = r for all θ < θ∗s but possibly
r(θ) > r for some θ > θ∗s , necessarily finds it optimal to attack for any x < x1, and so on.
Because {θn}∞n=0 is increasing and bounded from above it necessarily converges. Note that R
and Ψ are continuous and that the unique solution (x, θ′) to R(θ′, r,Ψ(x−θ
′












is attained at θ′ = θ#(σ) and x = x#(σ) (by uniqueness of the monotone equilibrium established
in Lemma 1). It follows that limn→+∞ θn = θ∗s if θ∗s ≤ θ#(σ) and limn→+∞ θn = θ#(σ) otherwise.
By implication, D(θ) = 1 for all θ < min{θ∗s , θ#(σ)}. This establishes the first part of the Lemma.
That θ∗s > θ#(σ) if and only if s > r#(σ) follows from the fact that, for any θ, W (θ, ·, 0)−L (θ, r)
is continuous and strictly decreasing in s, while for any s > r, W (·, s, 0)−L (·, r) is continuous and
strictly increasing in θ. This establishes the second part of the lemma. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. We start by establishing existence of pooling equilibria.
Lemma A0. For any σ > 0, E(r;σ) 6= ∅.
Proof of Lemma A0. Fix σ > 0. We establish the result by proving existence of a strategy
profile for the agents, along with a system of supporting beliefs, such that, given this profile, no
type of the policy maker finds it optimal to raise the policy above r. Consider the following strategy
profile for the agents: (i) for r = r, a (x, r) = 1 if and only if x < x#(σ) where x#(σ) is the unique
threshold defined in the proof of Lemma 1; for any r ∈ (r, ρ(θ¯)], a (x, r) = 1 irrespective of x; for
any r > ρ(θ¯), a (x, r) = 0 irrespective of x.
Given this profile, no type of the policy maker finds it optimal to raise the policy. This is
immediate for any θ ≤ θ¯: for these types, raising the policy to r ∈ (r, ρ(θ¯)] leads to regime change
(with payoff L(θ, r) < L(θ, r)) whereas raising the policy above ρ(θ¯) is strictly dominated by leaving
the policy to r. Thus consider a type θ > θ¯. Clearly, raising the policy to r ∈ (r, ρ(θ¯)] yields a lower
payoff than leaving the policy at r, for it is costly and it increases the measure of agents attacking.
That raising the policy to r > ρ(θ¯) also yields a lower payoff than leaving the policy at r follows
from the fact that














where the first inequality follows from Wr < 0, the second inequality from SCC along with the fact
that












in θ along with the
fact that WA ≤ 0. We thus conclude that, given the agents’ strategy, no type of the policy maker
has an incentive to raise the policy above r.
To complete the proof, it then suffices to show that the above strategy profile for the agents can
be supported by an appropriate system of beliefs. When r = r, Bayes’ rule imposes that, for any
θ, µ (θ|x, r) = 1 − Ψ(x−θσ ). From the construction in the proof of Lemma 1, it is then immediate
to see that, given these beliefs, attacking if and only if x < x#(σ) is sequentially optimal for the
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agents. Next, consider r ∈ (r, ρ(θ¯)]. Then let θ∗r = inf{θ ≥ θ : W (θ, r, 0) ≥ L(θ, r)}. Because for
any θ ∈ [θ∗r , θ¯], r ≤ ρ(θ), it then follows that, for any θ ∈ [θ∗r , θ¯], Z(θ, r) ≥ Q(r). Then let µ(·|x, r)
be any beliefs that assign probability one to the event that θ ∈ [θ∗r , θ¯], irrespective of x. Because for
any θ ∈ [θ∗r , θ¯], D (θ, r) = 1, it then follows that these beliefs satisfy∫ θ¯
θ∗r
Z(θ˜, r)dµ(θ˜|x, r) ≥ Q(r) for all x (18)
which guarantees that any agent who expects all other agents to attack finds it optimal to do the
same, irrespective of his signal. Finally, for any r > ρ(θ¯), let µ(·|x, r) be any beliefs that assign
probability one to θ > θ irrespective of x. Under such beliefs, any agent who expects no other agent
to attack finds it optimal to refrain from attacking. Q.E.D.
Next, consider s > r. We start by establishing the following preliminary result.
Lemma A1. For any σ > 0 any s ∈ (r, r#(σ)], there exists at least one pair (θ∗s , θ′′s ), with
θ′′s ≥ θ∗s such that θ∗s satisfies condition (8) and θ′′s satisfies condition (10). Furthermore, θ′′s > θ∗s if
s < r#(σ).









where θ#(σ) ∈ (θ, θ¯) is the unique threshold that corresponds to the pooling equilibria of parts (ii)
and in Proposition (1). Because, for any θ, W (θ, ·, 0) is continuous and strictly decreasing in s
and because, for any s, W (·, s, 0)− L (·, r) is continuous and strictly increasing in θ, we have that,
for any s ∈ (r, r#(σ)], {θ ≥ θ : W (θ, s, 0) ≥ L(θ, r} 6= ∅. Furthermore, θ∗s ≤ θ#(σ) with strict











From the results established in the proof of Lemma 1, one can then verify that R(θ, r, B(θ, θ;σ)) ≤ 0
for all θ ≤ θ#(σ) with strict inequality for θ < θ#(σ) and R(θ, r, B(θ, θ;σ)) > 0 for all θ > θ#(σ).
Because R(·, r, B(θ∗s , ·;σ)) is continuous in θ and R(θ¯, r, B(θ∗s , θ¯;σ)) > 0, this means that there
always exists a θ′′s ≥ θ∗s (with strict inequality if θ∗s < θ#(σ), that is if s < r#(σ)) that satisfies
condition (10). 
Next, we show that, when SCC holds, then for any σ > 0, any s > r#(σ), E(s;σ) = ∅. To see
this, note that, when s > r#(σ), then either {θ ≥ θ : W (θ, s, 0) ≥ L(θ, r} = ∅ or, if the set is not
empty, in which case its greatest lower bound is θ∗s > θ#(σ), then R(θ∗s , r, B(θ∗s , θ∗s ;σ)) > 0. Next
observe that, because the function
B(θ∗s , θ;σ) ≡ Ψ
(




is decreasing in θ over [θ∗s ,+∞) (to see this, use the representation given in (28) in the proof of
Proposition 9 below), then R(θ, r, B(θ∗s , θ;σ)) > 0 for all θ ≥ θ∗s . This means that there is no θ′′s ≥ θ∗s
that satisfies condition (10). To conclude that E(s;σ) = ∅, it then suffices to show that there is
also no type θ′′s ≥ θ∗s that satisfies condition (9). To see this, note that, for any θ ≥ θ∗s ,
G(θ; θ∗s , σ) ≡ W (θ, s, 0)−W (θ, r, B(θ∗s , θ;σ))
≤ W (θ, s, 0)−W (θ, r, B(θ∗s , θ∗s ;σ))
< 0
where the first inequality follows again from the fact that B(θ∗s , θ;σ) is decreasing in θ, while
the second inequality follows from SCC. We conclude that condition (9) admits no solution for
s > r#(σ). From Proposition 1, this means that E(s;σ) = ∅.
Thus consider s ∈ (r, r#(σ)]. That, for any s ∈ (r, r#(σ)], E (s;σ) 6= ∅, as well as the existence
of equilibria satisfying the properties of part (ii) in the proposition follows from Lemma A2 below.
Lemma A2. Assume SCC holds. For any σ > 0, any s ∈ (r, r#(σ)], there exists an equilibrium
in which r (θ) = s if θ ∈ (θ∗s , θ∗∗s (σ)] and r (θ) = r otherwise. The equilibrium is sustained by the
following strategy for the agents: (i) for r = r, a (x, r) = 1 if and only if x < x∗s = X(θ∗s , θ∗∗s (σ);σ);
for any r ∈ (r, s), a (x, r) = 1 irrespective of x; for any r ≥ s, a (x, r) = 0 irrespective of x.
Proof of Lemma A2. From Lemma A1, for any σ > 0 any s ∈ (r, r#(σ)], there always exists
a pair (θ∗s , θ′′s ) such that θ∗s satisfies condition (8) and θ′′s ≥ θ∗s satisfies condition (10). Thus let
θ∗∗s (σ) = sup{θ′′s ≥ θ∗s : θ′′s satisfies condition (9) or condition (10)}. We then have that, for any
θ ∈ (θ∗s , θ∗∗s (σ)],




X(θ∗s , θ∗∗s (σ);σ)− θ
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≤ 0, that is, if by















> 0, which means that θ∗∗s (σ)
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satisfies condition (9). In this case,




X(θ∗s , θ∗∗s (σ);σ)− θ
σ
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X(θ∗s , θ∗∗s (σ);σ)− θ
σ
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X(θ∗s , θ∗∗s (σ);σ)− θ∗∗s (σ)
σ
))








where the first inequality follows from the fact that W is non-increasing in A, the second inequality
from SCC, and the last equality from the fact that θ∗∗s (σ) satisfies condition (9). Similar arguments
imply that for any θ > θ∗∗s (σ),




X(θ∗s , θ∗∗s (σ);σ)− θ
σ
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To see this, note that if θ∗∗s (σ) satisfies condition (9), then the result follows from SCC along with







θ∗∗s (σ) = sup
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for any r ∈ (r, s) and A (θ, r) = A (θ, s) = 0 for any r ≥ s, the policy maker strictly prefers r to
any r ∈ (r, s) and s to any r > s. Indeed, for any type θ ≤ θ¯, raising the policy to r ∈ (r, s) leads
to regime change (with payoff L(θ, r) < L(θ, r)) whereas, for any type θ > θ¯, raising the policy to
r ∈ (r, s) yields a payoff W (θ, r, 1) < W (1, r, A (θ, r)). Likewise, raising the policy to r > s leads to
a lower payoff than raising the policy to s for any θ. Furthermore, r is dominant for any θ ≤ θ. For
θ > θ, on the other hand, the payoff from raising the policy to r = s is W (θ, s, 0) , while the payoff
from leaving the policy at r = r is U (θ, r, A(θ, r)) . From the definition of the thresholds θ∗s and
θ∗∗s (σ) and the properties established above, we then have that raising the policy to r = s is optimal
if and only if θ ∈ [θ∗s , θ∗∗s (σ)], which establishes the optimality of the policy maker’s strategy.
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Next, consider the agents. When r = r, D(θ, r) = 1 occurs if and only if θ ≤ θˆs, where θˆs is the
unique solution to
R(θˆs, r, A(θˆs, r)) = 0.
When, instead, r ∈ (r, s), D(θ, r) = 1 if and only if θ ≤ θ¯. Finally, for any r ≥ s, D(θ, r) = 1 if and
only if θ ≤ θ. An agent thus finds it optimal to follow the equilibrium strategy if and only if his
beliefs satisfy the following conditions:
when r = r,
∫ θˆs
−∞ Z(θ˜, r)dµ(θ˜|x, r) ≥ Q(r) if x < x∗s
and
∫ θˆs
−∞ Z(θ˜, r)dµ(θ˜|x, r) ≤ Q(r) if x ≥ x∗s;
(19)
when r ∈ (r, s),
∫ θ¯
−∞
Z(θ˜, r)dµ(θ˜|x, r) ≥ Q(r) for all x; (20)
when r ≥ s,
∫ θ
−∞
Z(θ˜, r)dµ(θ˜|x, r) ≤ Q(r) for all x. (21)
Beliefs are pinned down by Bayes’ rule when either r = r or r = s. In the first case (r = r), for any
θ ≤ θ∗s






















That these beliefs satisfy condition (19) follows from the uniqueness of the thresholdX(θ∗s , θ∗∗s (σ);σ)
which implies that the expected payoff from attacking changes sign only once at x = x∗s =
X(θ∗s , θ∗∗s (σ);σ). In the second case (r = s), µ(θ|x, s) = 0, in which case condition (21) is clearly
satisfied. Finally, whenever r /∈ {r, s}, there exist an arbitrarily large set of out-of-equilibrium
beliefs that satisfy (20) and (21) — see the construction in the proof of Lemma A0 for an example.
Combining the optimality of the agents’ strategies with the optimality of the policy maker’s
strategy gives the result. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. Most of the results in the proposition follow from Propositions 1 and 2
along with properties (1)-(2) below. To save on notation, hereafter we let θ∗r(σ) ≡ θ∗∗r (σ) ≡ θ#(σ)
denote the unique thresholds corresponding to any of the pooling equilibria of E (r;σ) .
Property 1. For any σ > 0 any s′, s′′ ∈ (r, r#(σ)], s′′ > s′ implies that ∆s′′(σ) ≤ ∆s′(σ).
To see this, note that, for any s ∈ (r, r#(σ)],
∆s(σ) ≡ θ∗∗s (σ)− θ∗s =
{
∆ˆs(σ) if Gˆ (∆; s, σ) < 0 all ∆ ≥ ∆ˆs(σ)
sup{∆ ≥ ∆ˆs(σ) : Gˆ (∆; s, σ) = 0} otherwise
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where ∆ˆs(σ) is the unique40 ∆ ≥ 0 that solves R
(







Gˆ (∆; s, σ) ≡ G (θ∗s + ∆; θ∗s , σ) ≡W (θ∗s + ∆, s, 0)−W
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X(θ∗s , θ∗s + ∆;σ)− θ∗s
σ
)
+ Bˆ(∆; s, σ)
]
= 0.
Integrating by parts and using the definition of Bˆ(∆; s, σ) we then have that Bˆ(∆; s, σ) is implicitly
defined by





























































is non-increasing in s along with the fact that
R (θ, r, A) is increasing in θ and decreasing in A in turn imply that ∆ˆs(σ) is non-increasing in s
over (r, r#(σ)].
Next, consider the function Gˆ (∆; s, σ) and observe that, for any σ > 0, Gˆ (·; ·, σ) is continuous
in (s,∆). Now fix s ∈ (r, r#(σ)) and σ > 0 and suppose that Gˆ (∆; s, σ) < 0 for all ∆ ≥ ∆ˆs(σ), in
which case ∆s(σ) = ∆ˆs(σ). Because Gˆ (∆; s, σ) is continuous in (s,∆), there exists a δ > 0 such
that, for any sˆ ∈ (s− δ, s+ δ), any ∆ ≥ ∆ˆs(σ)− δ, Gˆ (∆; sˆ, σ) < 0. Together with the monotonicity
of ∆ˆs(σ) in s, this means that ∂∆s(σ)/∂s ≤ 0.
Finally, consider the case where, given s ∈ (r, r#(σ)) and σ > 0 , {∆ ≥ ∆ˆs(σ) : Gˆ (∆; s, σ) =
0} 6= ∅ in which case ∆s(σ) = sup{∆ ≥ ∆ˆs(σ) : Gˆ (∆; s, σ) = 0}. The property that lim∆→+∞ Gˆ (∆; s, σ) <
0 implies that Gˆ (·; s, σ) must be locally strictly decreasing in ∆ at ∆ = ∆s(σ); that is,
∂Gˆ (∆s(σ); s, σ)
∂∆
< 0. (23)
































s + ∆s(σ), s, 0)−Wθ
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s + ∆s(σ), s, 0)−WA
(
θ∗s + ∆s(σ), r, Bˆ(∆s(σ); s, σ)
) ∂Bˆ(∆s(σ); s, σ)
∂s
≤ 0
That the second and third terms of (24) are nonpositive follows from the fact that W is decreasing
in r and in A along with the fact that ∂Bˆ(∆s(σ);s,σ)∂s ≤ 0 as shown above. That the first term of (24) is
also non-positive follows from the fact thatW (θ∗s + ∆s(σ), s, 0)−W
(
θ∗s + ∆s(σ), r, Bˆ(∆s(σ); θ∗s , σ)
)
=
0. The SCC along with the fact that θ∗s is locally nondecreasing then imply that the first term of
(24) is nonpositive. From the Implicit Function Theorem, we then have that (23) together with 24)
imply that ∂∆s(σ)/∂s ≤ 0.
Combining the results above, then implies that, for any σ > 0 any s′, s′′ ∈ (r, r#(σ)], s′′ > s′
implies that ∆s′′(σ) ≤ ∆s′(σ).
Property 2. For any σ, σ′ > 0, any s ∈ (r,min{r#(σ), r#(σ′)}), σ′ > σ implies ∆s(σ′) ≥
∆s(σ).
This follows from the proof of part (iii) of Proposition 9 below, where it is shown that ∆s(σ) is
increasing in σ.
Given the aforementioned properties, the results in the proposition can be established as follows.
First, note that, for any σ > 0, any F ∈ F(σ), any θ, any r > r,
P (r, θ;F, σ) =
{ ∫
s∈[r,r#(σ)] I{θ∈[θ∗s ,θ∗∗s (σ)]}dF (s) if r ∈ (r, r#(σ)]
0 if r > r#(σ)
∆(r;F, σ) =
{ ∫
s∈[r,r#(σ)] ∆s(σ)dF (s) if r ∈ (r, r#(σ)]
0 if r > r#(σ).
Part (i). Fix σ > 0 and F ∈ F(σ), take any r ∈ (r, r#(σ)] and let θ◦(r;F, σ) = θ∗r and
θ◦◦(r;F, σ) = sup{θ∗∗s (σ) : s ∈ [r, r#(σ)]}. From Proposition 1, we then have that P (r, θ;F, σ) > 0
only if θ ∈ [θ◦(r;F, σ), θ◦◦(r;F, σ)].
Part (ii). Again, fix σ > 0 and take any F ∈ F(σ). That D(θ;F, σ) is non-increasing in θ, with
D(θ;F, σ) = 1 for θ < θ and D(θ;F, σ) = 0 for θ > θ#(σ) follows directly from Proposition 1.
Part (iii). Fix σ > 0 and take any pair F, F ′ ∈ F(σ). For any θ ∈ (θ, θ#(σ)),
D(θ;F, σ) = F (r) + 1− F (ρ(θ))
and similarly for F ′. Because F ′(s) = F (s) for s ∈ {r, r#(σ)} and F ′(s) < F (s) for all s ∈ (r, r#),
then D(θ;F ′, σ) > D(θ;F, σ), unless D(θ;F, σ) = 1.
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Next, consider the probability of intervention. From Property 1 above, ∆s(σ) is a positive,
(weakly) decreasing, and differentiable function of s, for any s ∈ (r, r#(σ)). Now fix r ∈ (r, r#(σ)).
That F (r) = F ′(r) along with F ′(s) < F (s) for all s ∈ (r, r#(σ)) then imply that














[F (s)− F ′ (s)]ds
≥ 0.
Part (iv). Take any c.d.f. F with support Supp[F ] such that F (s) = 0 for all s ≤ r1 and
F (s) = 1 for all s ≥ r2 for some r1, r2 ∈ R with r < r1 < r2 < limσ→0+ r#(σ). Note that this
implies that there exists σ¯ > 0, such that, for any σ < σ¯, Supp[F ] ⊂ [r, r#(σ)]. That, for any
r > r, limσ→0+ ∆(r, F, σ) = 0 follows from the Dominated Convergence Theorem. To see this, let
H : R→ R be the function whose domain is Supp[F ] and that is given by
H(s) = sup{θ : U(θ, s, 0)− U(θ, r, 1) ≥ 0} − θ∗s
for all s ∈ Supp[F ]. It is immediate that H(s) ≥ 0, that H(·) is decreasing and that ∫ H(s)dF (s) <
∞. Furthermore, for any σ < σ¯ and any s ∈ Supp[F ], ∆s(σ) ≤ H(s). These properties, together
with the result in Proposition 9 in Appendix A, then imply that
lim
σ→0+









∆s(σ)dF (s) = 0.
That, for any θ, any σ, σ′ > 0, any F ∈ F(σ) ∩ F(σ′), D(θ;F, σ) = D(θ;F, σ′) follows from
Proposition 1.
Lastly, that σ′ > σ > 0 implies ∆(r, F, σ′) ≥ ∆(r, F, σ) for all r ∈ (r,min{r#(σ), r#(σ′)}) all
F ∈ F(σ) ∩ F(σ′), follows from Property 2 above. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. Part (i). To see that D(θ1, θ2;σ) and D¯(θ1, θ2;σ) are both non-
increasing in (θ1, θ2), in the weak-order sense, consider any pair (θ1, θ2), (θ′1, θ′2) such that θ1 ≤ θ′1
and θ2 ≤ θ′2. Clearly, the distribution of θ˜ conditional on the event that θ ∈ (θ′1, θ′2) first-order-
stochastically dominates the distribution of θ˜ conditional on the event that θ ∈ (θ1, θ2). Along
with the fact that, for any F ∈ F(σ), D(·;F, σ) is non-increasing in θ, this means that, for any
F ∈ F(σ), D(θ1, θ2;F, σ) ≥ D(θ′1, θ′2;F, σ). Standard envelope arguments, then imply that the same
monotonicities apply to D(θ1, θ2;σ) and D¯(θ1, θ2;σ). The result for P (r, θ1, θ2;σ) and P¯ (r, θ1, θ2;σ)
follows directly from Proposition 3.
Part (ii). That P (r, θ1, θ2;σ) is independent of σ is immediate. That also D(θ1, θ2;σ) is
independent of σ follows from the fact that, for any σ > 0, lims→r+ θ∗s = θ along with the fact that
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Ds(θ;σ) = 0 for any θ > θ∗s in any equilibrium in E(s;σ). That, for any (θ1, θ2), any σ, σ′ > 0,
θ2 < min{θ#(σ′), θ#(σ)} or θ1 > max{θ#(σ′), θ#(σ)} imply D¯(θ1, θ2;σ) = D¯(θ1, θ2;σ′) follows from
the fact that, for any σ > 0, any θ, Ds(θ;σ) ≤ Dr(θ;σ) together with the fact that Dr(θ;σ) = 1 for
all θ ≤ θ#(σ) while Dr(θ;σ) = 0 for all θ > θ#(σ).
Next, consider the claim that limσ→0+ P¯ (r, θ1, θ2;σ) = 0 for any r > r and any θ1, θ2 ∈ R.
Clearly, the result is true if r > r#(0+) ≡ limσ→0+ r#(σ). Thus take r ∈ (r, r#(0+)]. Let F denote
an arbitrary set of c.d.f.s F with support Supp[F ] ⊂ [r, ρ(θ¯)] with the following properties: (i)
F(σ) ⊂ F for any σ > 0; (ii) F is compact with respect to the metric d(·) defined, for any pair
F1, F2 ∈ F , by d(F1, F2) ≡ sup {|F1(A)− F2(A)| : A ∈ Σ} , where Σ is the Borel sigma algebra
associated with the interval [r, ρ(θ¯)]. For any σ > 0, any c.d.f. F ∈ F , any θ1 < θ2, and any r > r,
then let






I{θ∈[θ∗s ,θ∗∗s (σ)]}dF (s) dθ
with the convention that, given any s ∈ [r, ρ(θ¯)], I{θ∈[θ∗s ,θ∗∗s (σ)]} = 0 if there is no θ′′s ≥ θ∗s that
satisfies condition (9) or condition (10). Note that




P (r, θ;F, σ)dθ
if F ∈ F(σ), that is, if, given σ > 0, one restricts F to have support Supp[F ] ⊂ [r, r#(σ)].
By Proposition 9 in Appendix A, for any s ≤ r#(0+), limσ→0+ ∆s(σ) = 0 . This implies that,
for any θ ∈ [θ1, θ2], any s ∈ [r, ρ(θ¯)] with θ∗s 6= θ,
lim
σ→0+
I{θ∈[θ∗s ,θ∗∗s (σ)]} = 0.










I{θ∈[θ∗s ,θ∗∗s (σ)]}dF (s)






















where the first equality is again by the Dominated Convergence Theorem, while the second equality
follows from the following property. Given any c.d.f. F with support Supp[F ] ⊂ [r, ρ(θ¯)], there does
not exist a Lebesgue positive-measure set E ⊂ [θ1, θ2] such that, for any θ ∈ E, θ∗s = θ with strictly
positive probability. Formally, the set
S ≡
{





has zero Lebesgue measure, which in turn implies that the set
Θ+ ≡
{









I{θ∈[θ∗s ,θ∗∗s (σ)]}dF (s) > 0
has zero Lebesgue measure, which implies the result in (25).
Having established that, for any c.d.f. F ∈ F , limσ→0+ Pˆ (r, θ1, θ2;F, σ) = 0, we now show that






P (r, θ1, θ2;F, σ)
}
= 0.
First note that, by definition, for any σ > 0,
sup
F∈F(σ)
P (r, θ1, θ2;F, σ) ≤ sup
F∈F














Pˆ (r, θ1, θ2;F, σ)
}
. (26)
To establish the result, it thus suffices to show that the right hand side of (26) is zero. This is
established as follows. First, recall that, by assumption, F is compact in the metric d(F1, F2) ≡
sup {|F1(A)− F2(A)| : A ∈ Σ} . Because it is metric, then F is also Hausdorff. Next, note that,
for any σ¯ > 0, the function family
{
Pˆ (r, θ1, θ2; ·, σ)
}
σ∈(0,σ¯]
with domain F and range in [0, 1] is
uniform equicontinuous in the metric d(·) defined above. This means that for any ε > 0, there exists
a δ > 0 (which may depend on ε only) such that for any σ ∈ (0, σ¯] (i.e., for any family member
Pˆ (r, θ1, θ2; ·, σ)), any F1, F2 ∈ F such that d(F1, F2) < δ,
|Pˆ (r, θ1, θ2;F1, σ)− Pˆ (r, θ1, θ2;F2, σ)| < ε.
To see that this is true, note that
|Pˆ (r, θ1, θ2;F1, σ)− Pˆ (r, θ1, θ2;F2, σ)|
= 1θ2−θ1
∣∣∣∫ θ2θ1 [∫s∈[r,ρ(θ¯)] I{θ∈[θ∗s ,θ∗∗s (σ)]}dF1 (s)− ∫s∈[r,ρ(θ¯)] I{θ∈[θ∗s ,θ∗∗s (σ)]}dF2 (s)] dθ∣∣∣
= 1θ2−θ1
∣∣∣∫ θ2θ1 [F1(A(θ, σ))− F2(A(θ, σ))] dθ∣∣∣
where A(θ, σ) ≡ {s ∈ [r, ρ(θ¯)] : θ ∈ [θ∗s , θ∗∗s (σ)]} . It is then easy to see that, for any σ ∈ (0, σ¯], the
result follows by letting δ = ε. It is also easy to see that the function family
{
Pˆ (r, θ1, θ2; ·, σ)
}
σ∈(0,σ¯]
is uniformly bounded, i.e., that there exists M > 0 such that |Pˆ (r, θ1, θ2;F, σ)| < M all F ∈ F , all
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σ ∈ (0, σ¯]. From the Ascoli-Arzela Theorem, any sequence of equicontinuous, uniformly bounded,
functions defined on a compact Haurdorff space has a uniformly convergent subsequence (i.e., a sub-
sequence that is convergent in the sup-norm). This implies limσ→0+
{
supF∈F Pˆ (r, θ1, θ2;F, σ)
}
= 0.
Lastly, we show that when Z(θ, r) = z > r for all θ, then the bound D¯ is independent of σ
whereas the bound P¯ (r, θ1, θ2;σ) is a nondecreasing function of σ. The first property follows directly
from the fact that, in this case, θ#(σ) and hence r#(σ) are independent of σ > 0, together with
the fact that, for any θ > θ#, Ds(θ;σ) = 0 for all s, while for any θ ≤ θ# Dr(θ, σ) = 1 for all
σ > 0. The second property follows from the fact that, given any distribution F with support41
Supp[F ] ⊂ [r, r#],







I{θ∈[θ∗s ,θ∗∗s (σ)]}dF (s) dθ
That P (r, θ1, θ2;F, σ) is increasing in σ then follows from the fact that θ∗∗s (σ) is increasing in σ. By
the envelope theorem, that each P (r, θ1, θ2;F, σ) is weakly increasing in σ, then implies that the
upper bound P¯ (r, θ1, θ2;σ) is also weakly increasing in σ, which establishes the result. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5. For any θ, let






denote the difference between the payoffW (θ, s, 0) that type θ obtains by raising the policy to r = s
in case regime change does not occur and no agent attacks in the game in which policy interventions




(x#(σ)− θ)/σ)) that the same type
obtains in the game in which the option to intervene is absent. The fact that s < r#(σ) implies that,
for any type θ ∈ (θ∗s , θ#(σ)], ∆Πs(θ;σ) = W (θ, s, 0)−L(θ, r) > 0,; indeed any such type, by raising
the policy to r = s, can guarantee himself a payoff W (θ, s, 0) that is strictly higher than the payoff
Uo (θ;σ) = L(θ, r) that the same type would obtain absent the possibility to intervene. Furthermore,
for any θ > θ#(σ), ∆Πs(θ;σ) = W (θ, s, 0) −W (θ, r,Ψ
(
(x#(σ)− θ)/σ)). The fact that ∆Πs(θ;σ)
is continuous over (θ#(σ),+∞) together with SCC and the limit condition that limθ→∞ ρ(θ) = r
(which, recall, is equivalent to limθ→+∞W (θ, s, 0)−W (θ, r, 1) < 0), imply that there exists a unique
θ†s(σ) ≥ θ#(σ) such that ∆Πs(θ;σ) > 0 for θ ∈ [θ#(σ), θ†s(σ)] and ∆Πs(θ;σ) < 0 for θ > θ†s(σ).
Hence, no matter which particular equilibrium in E (s;σ) is played, any type θ ∈ (θ∗s , θ†s(σ)] is
necessarily strictly better off with the option to intervene, whereas any type θ ≤ θ∗s is just as well
off.
Next note that any type θ > θ†s(σ) can be strictly worse off with the option to intervene only if the
attack he expects when leaving the policy at r = r is strictly greater than the attack he would have
41Recall that in this case F(σ)= F(σ′) all σ, σ′ > 0.
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faced without the option to intervene, which is possible if and only if X(θ∗s , θ∗∗s (σ);σ) > x#(σ).42
However, σ small enough ensures that X(θ∗s , θ∗∗s (σ);σ) < x#(σ) and hence that the policy maker
is always better off with the option to intervene, no matter his type. This follows from the fact
that, when σ → 0+, θ∗∗s (σ)→ θ∗s and X(θ∗s , θ∗∗s (σ);σ)→ θ∗s in the game with policy intervention,43
whereas x#(σ)→ θ#(σ) in the game in which the option to intervene is absent. Together with the
fact that θ∗s < θ#(σ) then gives the result. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6. First, consider the supremum of the equilibrium payoffs. For any
θ > θ, the highest feasible payoff is W (θ, r, 0), the payoff enjoyed when regime change is avoided
without facing any attack and without incurring any cost of policy intervention. This payoff can be
approximated arbitrarily well in the game in which intervention is possible (it suffices to take any
equilibrium in which s is sufficiently close to r), which implies that U (θ;σ) ≥ Uo (θ;σ) for all θ > θ.
That U (θ;σ) > Uo (θ;σ) for θ ∈ (θ, θ#(σ)] follows directly from the fact that, without the option
to intervene, these types experience regime change. That limθ→+∞ |U (θ;σ)−Uo (θ;σ) | = 0 follows
from the fact, in the game without the option to intervene, limθ→+∞A(θ, r) = 0. This establishes
the first part of the proposition.
Next consider the infimum of the equilibrium payoffs. As explained in the proof of Proposition
5, type θ can be worse off with the option to intervene only if there exists an s ∈ (r, r#(σ)] such
that X(θ∗s , θ∗∗s (σ);σ) > x#(σ); recall that this means that there exists an equilibrium in which the
attack that type θ faces when he does not raise the policy above r is larger than in the game without
the option to intervene. Now suppose that such an s exists. From the result in Proposition 5, in this
case any type θ ≤ θ†s(σ) is still weakly better off (strictly for θ ∈ (θ∗s , θ†s(σ)]). However, by taking
the equilibrium in E (s;σ) in which all agents attack when r = r if and only if x < X(θ∗s , θ∗∗s (σ);σ)
ensures that, for all θ > θ†s(σ), the payoff
max {W (θ, s, 0) ;U (θ, r,Ψ ((X(θ∗s , θ∗∗s (σ);σ)− θ)/σ))}
that type θ obtains with the option to intervene is (weakly) lower than his payoff in the game in which
the option to intervene is absent.44 This means that there exists θ†(σ) such that U (θ;σ) < Uo (θ;σ)
42Recall from the analysis in Section 3, that (i) in any equilibrium in E(s;σ) no agent attacks when, after observing
r = r, he receives a signal x > X(θ∗s , θ∗∗s (σ);σ), and (ii) that there always exists one equilibrium in E(s;σ) such that,
after observing r = r, each agent attacks if and only if he receives a signal x < X(θ∗s , θ∗∗s (σ);σ).
43The first property follows directly from Proposition 9 in Appendix A. To see that the second property also holds,
note that, if this were not true, then the size of attack A(θ∗∗s (σ), r) at θ = θ∗∗s (σ) would converge to either zero or
one, making it impossible for type θ∗∗s (σ) to be indifferent between raising the policy to r = s and setting r = r.
44To see this, note that if W (θ, s, 0) > U (θ, r,Ψ ((X(θ∗s , θ∗∗s (σ);σ)− θ)/σ)) the result follows from the definition
of θ†s(σ). If, instead, the inequality is reversed, the result follows from the fact that, by not raising the policy, type θ
faces an attack Ψ ((X(θ∗s , θ∗∗s (σ);σ)− θ)/σ) greater than the attack Ψ
(
(x#(σ)− θ)/σ) he would have faced without
the option to intervene.
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only if θ > θ†(σ). That θ†(σ) > θ#(σ) is immediate given that there is no equilibrium in which a
type θ ≤ θ#(σ) can be made worse off.
Finally, to see why, for any θ, the difference between U (θ;σ) and Uo (θ;σ) vanishes as σ → 0+,
note that, for any θ ≤ θ#(0+) ≡ limσ→0+ θ#(σ), this difference is clearly zero because the lower
bound is simply the payoff obtained in any equilibrium in which type θ is forced to experience
regime change. For types θ > θ#(0+), on the other hand, the result follows from the fact that for










This implies that the lowest bound on the payoff for each θ > θ#(0+) is attained under any of the
pooling equilibria, which is clearly the same payoff as in the game in which the option to intervene
is absent. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7. For θ ≤ θ, it is dominant for the policy maker to set r. Similarly, for
θ > θ¯, it is dominant for the agents not to attack, which makes it iteratively dominant for the policy
maker to set r = r. Finally, take any θ ∈ (θ, θ¯]. Clearly, there is no subgame-perfect equilibrium in
which r(θ) > ρ(θ). On the other hand, for any r ≤ ρ(θ), the assumption that Z(θ, r) ≥ r implies
that the continuation game among the agents is a coordination game with two Nash equilibria—one
where nobody attacks and the status quo is maintained and another where everybody attacks and
the status quo is abandoned. This implies that, for any r′ ≤ ρ(θ), there exists a subgame-perfect
equilibrium in which the agents attack if and only if r < r′ and the policy maker raises the policy at
r(θ) = r′. This establishes part (i). Part (ii) follows from the properties above along with the fact
that, for any θ ∈ (θ, θ¯] there always exists a subgame-perfect equilibrium where all agents attack if
and only if r ≤ ρ(θ) in which case the policy maker optimally chooses not to intervene and hence
D(θ) = 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 8. The characterization of G(0) follows directly from Proposition 7. Thus
consider G(σ) for σ > 0 and note that this set is given by
G(σ) =

(θ, r): either r = r and θ ∈ R,
or r ∈ (r, ρ+] and θ ∈ (θ∗r , θ∗∗r ], where θ∗r = θ,
or r ∈ (ρ+, r#(σ)] and θ ∈ [θ∗r , θ∗∗r ], where θ∗r > θ.

Next, pick an arbitrary ε¯ ∈ (0, ρ(θ¯)− r#(0+)) if ρ+ = r and some ε¯ ∈ (0, ρ+ − r) if ρ+ > r, and for
any ε < ε¯ define the set H(ε) as follows: if ρ+ = r, then
H(ε) ≡

(θ, r): either r = r and θ ∈ R,
or r ∈ (r, r + ε) and θ > θ
or r ∈ [r + ε, r#(0+) + ε] and θ ∈ [ρ−1(r), ρ−1(r) + ε]
 ;
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whereas, if ρ+ > r, then
H(ε) ≡

(θ, r): either r = r and θ ∈ R,
or r ∈ (r, r + ε) and θ > θ
or r ∈ [r + ε, ρ+]and θ ∈ (θ, θ + ε)
or r ∈ [ρ+, r#(0+) + ε] and θ ∈ [ρ−1(r), ρ−1(r) + ε]
 .
Note that, in either case, the results in Proposition 9 in Appendix A guarantee that, for any
ε ∈ (0, ε¯), there exists σ¯ > 0 such that
G(σ) ⊂ H(ε)
for all σ ∈ (0, σ¯). Finally, note that, for all σ > 0,
G(σ) ⊃
{
(θ, r): either r = r and θ ∈ R,
or r ∈ (ρ+, r# (σ)] and θ = ρ−1(r)
}
Combining the above two properties gives the result. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 9. Fix ε > 0 and let
θ#(0+) ≡ lim
σ→0+





where, for any θ ≥ θ, rˆ(θ) is implicitly defined by W (θ, rˆ(θ), 0) = L(θ, r).
Part (i). Clearly, irrespective of σ, E (s;σ) = ∅ whenever {θ ≥ θ : W (θ, s, 0) ≥ L(θ, r)} = ∅.
Thus assume that this set is non-empty and denote by θ∗s its largest lower bound. We establish the
result using the properties below.
Property 1. There exist δ > 0 and σˆ > 0 such that for any σ < σˆ, θ∗s > θ#(0+) + δ whenever
s > r#(σ) + ε.
To see this, take ε′ < ε/2. By continuity of rˆ(θ) and θ#(σ) and the fact that r#(σ) = rˆ(θ#(σ)),
there exists σˆ > 0 such that, whenever σ < σˆ, |r#(σ) − r#(0+)| < ε′. Hence, for any σ < σˆ,
s > r#(σ) + ε implies that s > r#(0+) − ε′ + ε > r#(0+) + ε′. Furthermore, by the continuity
of rˆ(θ), there exists δ > 0 such that |rˆ(θ) − r#(0+)| < ε′ whenever |θ − θ#(0+)| < δ. By the
monotonicity of rˆ(θ), we then have that rˆ(θ) < s for any θ < θ#(0+) + δ which means that
θ∗s ≥ θ#(0+) + δ.
Property 2. Let σˆ be the threshold in property 1. There exist 0 < σ′ < σˆ and θ > θ such that,
for any σ < σ′, any s > r#(σ) + ε, any A, any θ > θ, R(θ, r, A) > 0 and W (θ, s, 0) < W (θ, r, A).
This follows from the limit condition that, for any s > r, limθ→+∞[W (θ, s, 0)−W (θ, r, 1)] < 0.





0 if θ > θ∗
(Z (θ∗)−Q(r)) /Z(θ∗) if θ = θ∗
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Recall that B(θ∗, θ;σ) is defined as






where X(θ∗, θ;σ) is implicitly defined by condition (5). To simplify the exposition, let us momen-
tarily use X and B as short-cuts for, respectively, X(θ∗, θ;σ) and B(θ∗, θ;σ). Condition (5) can























From (27), X = σΨ−1(B) + θ. Replacing this into the above, and integrating the first term by























dθ˜ −Q(r)B = 0.
Note that the left-hand side of the above equation is decreasing in B. This guarantees that the
above equation admits a unique solution for B—and therefore that (5) admits a unique solution, as
stated in the main text. Next, noting that the left-hand side of the above equation is increasing in σ.
It then follows from the implicit function theorem that B is also increasing in σ, as claimed above.
Finally, one can also use the above formula to verify that, for any θ > θ∗, limσ→0+ B(θ∗, θ;σ) = 0,
while for θ = θ∗, limσ→0+ B(θ∗, θ;σ) = (Z (θ∗, r)−Q(r)) /Z(θ∗, r), which completes the proof of
Property 3.
Property 4. Let δ > 0 be the threshold in property 1 and σ′ be the threshold in property 2.
Define
Θˆ ≡ {(θ∗, θ) : θ∗ ∈ [θ#(0+) + δ, θ], θ ∈ [θ∗, θ]}.
There exists 0 < σ1 < σ′ such that, for any σ < σ1, any (θ∗, θ) ∈ Θˆ,
G(θ; θ∗, σ) < 0 < R(θ, r, B(θ∗, θ;σ))
where, for any σ > 0, any (θ∗, θ) with θ ≥ θ∗ ≥ θ,
G(θ; θ∗, σ) ≡W (θ, rˆ(θ∗), 0)−W (θ, r, B(θ∗, θ;σ)) .
Using property 3, for any (θ∗, θ) ∈ Θˆ,
lim
σ→0+
R(θ, r, B(θ∗, θ;σ)) =
{
R(θ, r, 0) > 0 if θ > θ∗
R (θ∗, r, (Z (θ∗, r)−Q(r)) /Z(θ∗, r)) > 0 if θ = θ∗
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where the second inequality follows from the fact that the functionR (θ∗, r, (Z (θ∗, r)−Q(r)) /Z(θ∗, r))
is strictly increasing in θ∗ and equal to zero at θ∗ = θ#(0+) (this follows from Lemma 1) along with
the fact that θ∗ > θ#(0+) + δ.
Likewise, for any (θ∗, θ) ∈ Θˆ,
lim
σ→0+
G(θ; θ∗, σ) =
{
W (θ, rˆ(θ∗), 0)−W (θ, r, 0) < 0 if θ > θ∗
L(θ∗, r)−W (θ∗, r, (Z (θ∗, r)−Q(r)) /Z(θ∗, r)) < 0 if θ = θ∗
where the second inequality follows from the fact that R (θ∗, r, (Z (θ∗, r)−Q(r)) /Z(θ∗, r)) > 0
implies W (θ∗, r, (Z (θ∗, r)−Q(r)) /Z(θ∗, r)) > L(θ∗, r).
Next, note that, for any σ > 0, the functions R(·, r, B(·, ·;σ)) and G(·; ·, σ) are continuous on Θˆ
and that, for any (θ∗, θ) ∈ Θˆ, they are monotone in σ (by the monotonicity of B in σ). Because Θˆ
is compact, the result then follows from Dini’s theorem.
Property 5. Let δ > 0 be the threshold in property 1 and σ1 > 0 the threshold in property 4.
For any σ < σ1,
G(θ; θ∗, σ) < 0 < R(θ, r, B(θ∗, θ;σ))
for any (θ∗, θ) such that either (a) θ∗ ∈ [θ#(0+) + δ, θ] and θ > θ, or (b) θ∗ > θ and θ ≥ θ∗.
The result follows directly from properties 2 and 4.
Together, the above properties imply that for any σ < σ1, s > r#(σ) + ε, there exists no pair
(θ∗s , θ′′s ) such that θ∗s satisfies conditions (8) and θ′′s ≥ θ∗s satisfies either condition (9) or condition
(10). From Proposition (1) this means that, for any σ < σ1, E (s;σ) = ∅ for any s > r#(σ) + ε.
Part (ii). Let ε > 0 be the same as in part (i). By the continuity and strict monotonicity of the
function rˆ(θ) over [θ,+∞), together with the continuity of the θ#(σ) function, there exist σ+ > 0
and ε+ ∈ (0, ε) such that, for any σ < σ+ θ∗s > θ#(σ) + ε implies that s > r#(σ) + ε+. The result
in part (i) then implies that there exists a σ2 ∈ (0, σ+) such that, for any σ < σ2, E (s;σ) 6= ∅ only
if θ∗s ≤ θ#(σ) + ε.
Part (iii). Take the same ε > 0 as in parts (i) and (ii) and let r = r+ ε. By the limit condition
that limθ→+∞[W (θ, r, 0) −W (θ, r, 1)] < 0, there exists a θ > θ¯ such that, for any θ > θ, any A,
any s ≥ r + ε, R(θ, r, A) > 0 and W (θ, s, 0) < W (θ, r, A). This means that, for any s ≥ r + ε,
if a pair (θ∗s , θ′′s ) exists such that θ∗s satisfies condition (8) and θ′′s ≥ θ∗s satisfies either condition
(9) or condition (10), then necessarily θ∗s , θ′′s ≤ θ. In turn, this also means that, for any s ≥ r + ε,
E (s;σ) 6= ∅ only if s ≤ rˆ(θ). Thus assume rˆ(θ) ≥ r + ε. For any s ∈ [r + ε, rˆ(θ)], then let θ∗s
be the threshold corresponding to s, as defined in (8) and take any arbitrary θ > θ∗s . Because
limσ→0+ B(θ∗s , θ;σ) = 0, and because B(θ∗s , ·;σ) is decreasing in θ (this can be seen from (28)), we
then have that, for any s ∈ [r+ ε, rˆ(θ)], either there exists no θ′′s ≥ θ∗s that satisfies condition (9) or
condition (10) when σ is small enough, in which case E (s;σ) 6= ∅. Else, if such a θ′′s exists, then the
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highest θ′′s ≥ θ∗s that satisfies either condition (9) or condition (10, which is θ∗∗(σ), must converge
to θ∗s as σ → 0.
For any s ∈ [r + ε, rˆ(θ)] any σ, then let ∆s(σ) = θ∗∗(σ) − θ∗s if a θ′′s ≥ θ∗s that satisfies either
condition (9) or condition (10) exists and ∆s(σ) = 0 otherwise. Because for any θ∗, θ, θ ≥ θ∗,
B(θ∗θ; ·) is increasing in σ, we then have that, for any s ∈ [r+ ε, rˆ(θ)], ∆s(σ) is increasing in σ with
limσ→0+ ∆(σ) = 0. Because, for any σ > 0, ∆s(σ) is clearly continuous in s over [r + ε, rˆ(θ)], from
Dini’s theorem we then have that there exists a σ3 > 0 such that, for σ < σ3, any s ∈ [r + ε, rˆ(θ)],
either E (s;σ) = ∅, or θ∗∗s (σ) ≤ θ∗s + ε, which establish the result.
Combining the proofs of parts (i)-(iii), the result in the proposition then follows by letting
σ¯ = min{σ1, σ2, σ3}. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 10. Part (i) follows from Lemma A3 below, whose proof is similar to that
of Proposition 5 in Angeletos, Hellwig and Pavan (2006), adapted to the payoff structure considered
here. Part (ii) follows from Lemma A4.
Lemma A3. Assume ψ is log-concave. For any σ > 0, any s ∈ (r, r#(σ)], there exists a nonempty
set of types Θs(σ) ⊂ [θ∗s , θ∗∗s (σ)], with inf Θs(σ) = θ∗s , a threshold x∗s, and an equilibrium in which
r (θ) =
{




1 if θ < θ∗s
0 if θ > θ∗s
The equilibrium is sustained by the following strategy for the agents: (i) for r = r, a (x, r) = 1 if
and only if x < x∗s; for any r ∈ (r, s), a (x, r) = 1 irrespective of x; for any r ≥ s, a (x, r) = 0
irrespective of x.
Proof of Lemma A3. The proof is in three steps. Steps 1 and 2 construct the set Θs(σ) and
establish properties that are useful for step 3. Step 3 shows that there exists a system of beliefs
that support the proposed strategies as part of an equilibrium.
Step 1. Fix s ∈ (r, r#(σ)] and let θ∗s = inf{θ ≥ θ : W (θ, s, 0) ≥ L(θ, r)}. Next, let S : R → 2R
and m : R2 → [0, 1] denote, respectively, the correspondence and the function defined as follows:




) ≡ ∫ θ∗s−∞ Z(θ˜, r) 1σψ(x′−θ˜σ )dθ˜
1− ∫S(x) 1σψ(x′−θ˜σ )dθ˜ −Q(r)
The set S (x) represents the set of types who prefer raising the policy to r = s and then facing no






































By definition, any type below θ∗s prefers leaving the policy at r = r to raising the policy to r = s,
irrespective of the size of the attack. It follows that θ∗s ≤ inf S(x) for any x. In turn, m (x, x′) is
the expected payoff from attacking for an agent with signal x′ when he observes r and believes that
regime change will occur if and only if θ < θ∗s and that the policy is r (θ) = r if and only if θ /∈ S (x) .
Step 2 below shows that, when ψ is log-concave, then for any x, the function m (x, ·) is non-
increasing in x′. It then uses this property to show that either (i) there exists an x∗s ∈ R such that
m (x∗s, x∗s) = 0, or (ii) m (x, x) > 0 for all x, in which case we let x∗s = +∞. In either case, the
triple (x∗s, θ∗s ,Θs(σ)) with Θs(σ) = S (x∗s) identifies an equilibrium for the fictitious game in which
the policy maker is restricted to set r ∈ {r, s} and the agents are restricted not to attack when
r = s. Step 3 concludes the proof by showing that the same triple identifies an equilibrium for the
unrestricted game.
Step 2. Note that S (x) is continuous in x, with S (x1) ⊆ S (x2) for any x1 ≤ x2 (this follows from
the fact that the policy maker’s payoff from not raising the policy declines with the aggressiveness
of the agents’ behavior). Also note that m (x, x′) is continuous in (x, x′) and nondecreasing in x
(by the monotonicity of S(x)). Below we show that, when ψ is log-concave, m (x, x′) is also non-
increasing in x′. To see this, note that, for any θ′ ≤ θ∗s , the probability that an agent with signal x′














with Ix(θ˜) = 1 when θ˜ ∈ S(x) and Ix(θ˜) = 0 otherwise. It follows that µ(θ′|x′, r) is decreasing in









































































∣∣∣∣∣∣ θ˜ > θ′, x′, r
 < 0,
which holds true when ψ′/ψ is decreasing, i.e. when ψ is log-concave. That Z(·, r) is non-increasing
together with the fact that µ(θ′|x′, r) is decreasing in x′ for any θ′ ≤ θ∗s then implies that the

























is non-increasing in x′.45 For future reference, also note that limx′→+∞m(x, x′) < 0.
Having established that the expected payoff from attacking m (x, x′) is continuous in (x, x′),
nondecreasing in x and non-increasing in x′, next note that
S (x) ⊆ S¯ ≡ {θ : W (θ, s, 0) ≥ U (θ, r, 1)}






1− ∫S¯ 1σψ(x′−θ˜σ )dθ˜ −Q(r) ≥ m
(
x, x′






















Now define the sequence {xk}∞k=0 , with xk ∈ R ∪ {+∞}, as follows. For k = 0, let x0 ≡ xˆ.
For k ≥ 1, let xk be the solution to m (xk−1, xk) = 0 if xk−1 < +∞; if, instead, xk−1 = +∞, let
xk ≡ inf {x′ : m (xk−1, x′) ≤ 0} if {x′ : m (xk−1, x′) ≤ 0} 6= ∅ and xk ≡ +∞ otherwise. The fact
that











dθ˜ −Q(r) = 0
together with the continuity and monotonicities of m, ensures that this sequence is well defined and
nondecreasing. It follows that either limk→∞ xk ∈ [xˆ,+∞), or limk→∞ xk = +∞. In the former
case, let x∗s = limk→∞ xk and Θs(σ) = S (x∗s) ; in the latter, let x∗s = +∞ and Θs(σ) = S (∞) ≡ S¯.
Finally, to see that inf Θs(σ) = θ∗s note that the threshold xˆ defined above coincides with
X(θ∗s , θ∗s ;σ). Because θ∗s ≤ θ#(σ), from the results in the proof of Lemma A1 above, we then
have that R(θ∗s , r,Ψ((X (θ∗s , θ∗s ;σ)− θ∗s)/σ) ≤ 0. Because x∗s ≥ xˆ, we then have that R(θ∗s , r,Ψ((x∗s−




is decreasing in θ, this in turn implies that there exits θˆs ∈ [θ∗s , θ∗∗s (σ)] such that R(θˆs, r,Ψ((x∗s −
θˆs)/σ)) ≤ 0 if and only if θ ≤ θˆs. It follows that necessarily r(θ) = s for all θ ∈ (θ∗s , θˆs], thus
establishing that inf Θs(σ) = θ∗s .
We conclude that the triple (x∗s, θ∗s ,Θs(σ)) identifies an equilibrium for the fictitious game in
which the policy maker is restricted to set r ∈ {r, s} and the agents are restricted not to attack
when r = s.
Step 3. We now show how the triple (x∗s, θ∗s ,Θs(σ)) of Step 2 also identifies an equilibrium for
the unrestricted game. The proof here parallels that of Lemma A2. Below we simply show existence
of beliefs for the agents satisfying conditions (19), (20) and (21).
45To see this, note that, given any two absolutely continuous c.d.f.s F1 and F2 with F1(θ) ≤ F2(θ) for all θ < θ∗s ,





h as the payoff Z from regime change and F1 and F2 as the agent’s posterior for two different signals x1 and x2, with
x1 ≥ x2, gives the result.
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When r = r, beliefs are pinned down by Bayes rule and such that, for any θ ≤ θ∗s ,
µ(θ|x, r) = 1−Ψ(
x−θ
σ )
1− ∫Θs(σ) 1σψ(x−θ˜σ )dθ˜ ,
while for any θ ∈ (θ∗s , θˆs),46
µ(θ|x, r) = 1−Ψ(
x−θ∗s
σ )
1− ∫Θs(σ) 1σψ(x−θ˜σ )dθ˜ .
As shown above, these beliefs are decreasing in x. By the definition of x∗s, it then follows that
condition (19) is satisfied when r = r. Next consider r = s. Again, in this case beliefs are pinned
down by Bayes rule and such that µ(θ|x, s) = 0, all x, in which case condition (21) is clearly satisfied.
Finally, whenever r /∈ {r, s}, there exist an arbitrarily large set of out-of-equilibrium beliefs that
satisfy (20) and (21) — see the construction in Lemmas A0 and A2 above. 
Lemma A4. Suppose SCC holds and ψ is log-concave. Then for any σ > 0, any s ∈ (r, r#(σ)],
any equilibrium in E(s;σ) is such that r (θ) = s for all θ ∈ (θ∗s , θ∗∗s (σ)).
Proof of Lemma A4. The result for s = r#(σ) follows directly from the fact that, when SCC
holds, then θ∗s = θ#(σ) = θ∗∗s (σ). That θ∗s = θ#(σ) is immediate. To see that θ∗∗s (σ) = θ#(σ), recall
























> L(θ, r). (30)













































, as shown in the proof of Proposition




















, which implies that the only θ′′s ≥ θ∗s = θ#(σ) that possibly satisfies
(9) or (10) is θ′′s = θ#(σ), which means that θ∗∗s (σ) = θ∗s = θ#(σ) for s = r#(σ).
Thus consider s ∈ (r, r#(σ)). From the proof of Lemma 4, a (x, r) = 0 for all x > X(θ∗s , θ∗∗s (σ);σ), while


















< 0 for θ < θ#(σ), we







< 0, while by the fact that θ∗∗s (σ) satisfies condition




X(θ∗s ,θ∗∗s (σ))−θ∗∗s (σ)
σ
))
≥ 0. Combining, we have that
R (θ∗s , r, A(θ
∗
s , r)) < 0 ≤ R (θ∗∗s (s), r, A (θ∗∗s (s), r)) (31)
Now the fact that the noise distribution ψ is log-concave implies that, after observing r = r, irre-
spective of the shape of the equilibrium policy r(θ) in the region [θ∗s , θ∗∗s (σ)] of possible intervention,
the aggregate attack A(θ, r) is monotone in θ — see the proof of Lemma A3. Condition (31), to-
gether with the monotonicity of A(θ, r) in θ and the property that Rθ > 0 > RA then ensures that
there exists a unique θˆs ∈ [θ∗s , θ∗∗s (σ)] such that R (θ, r, A (θ, r)) ≤ 0 if and only if θ ≤ θˆs. Now
if θˆs = θ∗∗s (σ), then obviously r(θ) = s for all θ ∈ (θ∗s , θ∗∗s (σ)]. Thus suppose that θˆs < θ∗∗s (σ),
which means θ∗∗s (σ) satisfies condition (9). Now let θ
sup
s ≡ sup{θ : r(θ) = s}. Clearly, θsups ≥ θˆs; if
θsups < θˆs, then types θ ∈ (θsups , θˆs] would be better off by raising the policy to r = s rather than
leaving the policy at r and then facing regime change.
We now show that all types θ ∈ (θ∗s , θsups ] necessarily raise the policy to r = s. This is immediate
when θsups = θˆs. Thus suppose θ
sup
s > θˆs. Because, in this case, R (θ
sup
s , r, A (θ
sup
s , r)) > 0, then θsups
must satisfy
W (θsups , s, 0) = W (θ
sup




h(θ) ≡W (θ, s, 0)−W (θ, r, A (θ, r))
Note that SCC, along with the monotonicity of A (·, r), implies that h(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ (θ∗s , θsups ),
which in turn implies that all θ ∈ (θ∗s , θsups ) necessarily raise the policy to r = s. But then necessarily
A (θ, r) = Ψ
(





This means that θsups must satisfy condition (9). Now recall that θ∗∗s (σ) is the highest θ′′s that
satisfies (9). That θsups = θ∗∗s (σ) in turn follows from the fact that, under SCC, the function




X (θ∗s , θ;σ)− θ
σ
))
is strictly negative for all θ ≥ θsups which implies that θsups = θ∗∗s (σ).  Q.E.D.
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